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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in finding that trial 
counsel's failure to investigate and impeach the testimony of the 
state's key witness, a confidential informant who provided the 
only direct evidence at trial of the alleged drug sale, did not 
deprive defendant of his constitutional rights to competent 
representation, confrontation, and a fair trial? 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in refusing to 
address the plain error of trial counsel's failure to object to 
plain hearsay testimony which acted to corroborate the testimony 
of the confidential informant, simply because the issue was not 
raised until defendant's reply brief? 
3. Whether defendant's appellate counsel's failure to raise 
the issue of trial counsel's failure to object to plain hearsay 
until the reply brief deprived defendant of his constitutional 
right to competent representation on appeal? 
4. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the 
prosecutor's role in creating the false impression to the jury 
that the confidential informant had been incarcerated 
continuously from the time of the undercover operation to the 
time of trial, when in reality he had received early release 
shortly after the undercover operation, did not constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct? 
5. Whether the court of appeals erred in finding that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendants' 
probation, where the state failed to present evidence that the 
alleged probation violation was willful? 
6. Whether the court of appeals erred in ruling that 
defendant's arrest, which did not comply with Utah law, was 
illegal, thereby invalidating the search incident to arrest? 
OPINION BELOW 
State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 022, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 35. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
On February 10, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued its 
opinion in this case (Appendix A). Jurisdiction is conferred on 
this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (1996) and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1996). 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions 
will be determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 64-13-1 et. seq. (1986 & Supp. 1992) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1994) 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 
The text of those provisions is contained in Appendix B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In March 1992, Maestas was charged with unlawful 
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distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a 
public school, a First Degree Felony offense in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1953 as amended), and unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a Third Degree Felony 
offense in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1953 
as amended). (R. 6-7.) Maestas was represented by private 
counsel during the proceedings. (R. 25.) The case went to trial 
in April 1993 (R. 42, 73), and the jury found Maestas guilty on 
both charges. (R. 69-72.) Judgment was entered against Maestas 
(R. 104-06), and the judge stayed the prison sentence and ordered 
Maestas to serve probation. (R. 138-39.) 
In June 1993, private counsel filed a notice of appeal in 
this case (R. 76-77), but failed to take any further action in 
connection with the appeal. In June 1994, this Court dismissed 
the appeal. (R. 109; 123-24.) Thereafter, the state filed an 
order to show cause why probation should not be revoked. In 
September 1994 the trial court revoked probation and Maestas was 
sent to prison to serve his sentence. (R. 146-48; 152-53.) 
In 1996, the trial court consolidated matters relevant to 
the trial and raised in the Rule 65B proceedings with the 
original criminal action. Thereafter, Maestas was re-sentenced. 
(Case No. 950902479 at 146, 154, 156-64; also R. 174-77.) In 
accordance with Utah law, Maestas is appealing from the judgments 
of conviction dated June 17, 1996 (R. 175-78), and attached as 
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Appendix C. 
In June 1997, the court of appeals granted Maestas' Motion 
pursuant to Rule 23B, see Appendix D, with Findings in the trial 
court regarding ineffective assistance atttached as Appendix E. 
On February 10, 2000, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
convictions and the revocation of probation. State v. Maestas, 
2000 UT App 022, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 35. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Officials from the Department of Corrections ("DOC") engaged 
in a clandestine operation to determine the source of unlawful 
drugs going into the Utah State Prison. (R. 368; 384.) The 
officers arranged for an inmate, Tony Waldron, to make contact 
with specific persons outside the facility, who officers believed 
had been supplying drugs to individuals in the prison.(See R. 
255; 358-59; 374.) DOC officials had a list of four or five 
suppliers who Waldron would contact. (R. 385.) Nothing in the 
record supports that Maestas was on that list. 
Indeed, the record supports that officials and Waldron did 
not consider Maestas to be a target of the operation. 
Correctional officers admitted that the operation "had nothing to 
do with Maestas." (R. 239; see also 266-68; 362-63; 385.) 
Likewise, the trial judge in this case found that Maestas1 
involvement in the matter was "an accidental happening." (R. 
284. ) 
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On the day of the transaction, Waldron made contact with two 
women who were to line him up with a targeted supplier. (R. 
233.) The women attempted to make contact with the supplier by 
telephone and pager, but were unsuccessful. (R. 234; 239; 361-
62.) Thereafter, the women indicated they may be able to buy 
drugs from Maestas.(R. 234; 362-63.) Although the DOC had no 
reason to involve Maestas in the matter, there was no effort to 
refocus the operation to its intended purpose, and no effort to 
involve local law enforcement. Rather, Waldron and the women 
found Maestas, and according to evidence presented at trial, 
purchased drugs. (R. 234-35; 363; 376-77.) 
Thereafter, as Maestas and a second person left in Maestas' 
car from the apartment where the transaction allegedly occurred, 
correctional officials followed and engaged overhead lights to 
pull Maestas over to the side of the road. (R. 270.) 
Investigator Sundquist arrested Maestas and searched Maestas and 
the car. (R. 271; 273.) According to Sundquist, in connection 
with the search, he confiscated approximately $385 in cash, a 
white powdery substance, and an additional substance that 
Sundquist found in Maestas1 pockets. (R. 271.) Maestas was 
charged with one count each of unlawful distribution and unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance. (R. 006-007.) 
The case went to trial. (See R. 295-503.) During cross-
examination of Waldron, defense counsel failed to inquire into 
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matters impugning Waldron1s character. (R. 374-83.) Specifically, 
Waldron had been convicted of several counts of forgery, 
aggravated assault by a prison inmate and felony fleeing; his 
history included additional forgery-related convictions; he was 
suspected of smuggling drugs into the prison and had a history of 
hiding drugs on his person and otherwise possessing drugs while 
in the prison; he was found to have injection sites on his arm; 
and Waldron was never charged or disciplined in connection with a 
drug smuggling investigation that began in the prison in November 
1991. (R. 784-89.) Waldron was given a parole date of January 
1993. (R. 785.) Yet, approximately two weeks after Waldron's 
involvement in the alleged transaction with Maestas, Waldron was 
paroled from prison. Waldron was paroled 9 months earlier than 
scheduled, on April 2, 1992. (R. 786.) 
In April 1993, the jury found Maestas guilty of the offenses 
as charged (R. 69, 70), and the judge stayed the prison sentence 
for 36 months while Maestas served probation in the Odyssey House 
program. (R. 104-06.) 
Thereafter, on June 23, 1994, Adult Probation and Parole 
filed a Progress/Violation Report with the court alleging that 
Maestas had "become suicidal, homicidal, and had begun attacking 
staff and personnel at Odyssey House." (R. 110.) In response, 
the court issued a warrant for Maestas1 arrest and ordered him to 
show cause why probation should not be revoked. (R. 112-18.) 
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The order to show cause alleged the following: 
[D]efendant has failed to participate and comply to the 
conditions set forth by the Odyssey House program, which 
resulted in his removal from said program on June 23, 1994, 
in violation of condition number 11.5 of the defendant's 
Probation Agreement and the Court's order. 
(R. 118.) At the order to show cause hearing the evidence 
reflected that on "a couple of different occasions," Maestas 
indicated that he wanted to kill himself. (R. 615.) He was 
placed on a suicide watch and eventually taken to the University 
of Utah Hospital emergency room because of the "ideation" he had 
"about hurting himself, running in the street, letting someone 
run over him." (R. 616.) 
The clinical director of the Odyssey House program, Tracy 
Anderson, told Maestas to let him know if Maestas continued 
having suicidal thoughts; if Maestas continued, he would not be 
allowed to stay in the program "because [Odyssey House was] not a 
psychiatric setting" and was not equipped to handle the matter. 
(R. 616-19.) 
Anderson acknowledged that Maestas did not violate a "hard" 
rule at Odyssey House; rather, Maestas was notified that he could 
not engage in "suicide gesturing" since the program was not set 
up to deal with that. (R. 624-25.) 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that 
"there has been a violation of the terms of the conditions of 
probation. That violation was knowing and intentional under 
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circumstances where the defendant had the ability to comply with 
the Court's order on the conditions of probation. Therefore 
probation will be revoked." (R. 653.) A copy of the trial 
court's order is attached hereto as Appendix F. An appeal and a 
23B remand proceeding followed as set forth in the Statement of 
the Case, supra. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT TRIAL 
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND IMPEACH THE TESTIMONY 
OF THE STATE'S KEY WITNESS DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO COMPETENT REPRESENTATION, 
CONFRONTATION, AND A FAIR TRIAL. 
Defense counsel's performance was clearly deficient in that 
he failed to cross-examine the state's key witness with evidence 
that had a direct impact on the witness' credibility. The court 
of appeals held that defendant suffered no prejudice through this 
failure, "because the informant's testimony was abundantly 
corroborated . . ." State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 022, 1 15, 388 
Utah Adv. Rep. 35. 
The state's key witness, Tony Waldron, testified that 
Maestas sold cocaine to him for $100. (R. 376-77.) Waldron 
described the transaction to correctional officers through a wire 
that he was wearing, and he identified Maestas to officers as the 
supplier for purposes of the arrest. (R. 377.) During cross-
examination, counsel for the defense, Victor Gordon, failed to 
introduce evidence of Waldron's criminal background, which 
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included convictions for crimes of dishonesty, and motive for 
Waldron's involvement in ensuring Maestas' arrest and conviction. 
Gordon likely failed to introduce the evidence because he was 
unaware of it, supporting the determination that Gordon failed to 
investigate the matter. Gordon's failures constitute ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, as set forth below. 
Specifically, with respect to Waldron's criminal background, 
Gordon failed to introduce into evidence information concerning 
Waldron's crimes of dishonesty and other matters that would im-
peach his credibility. A copy of that portion of the trial 
transcript containing Waldron's testimony is attached hereto as 
Appendix G. As a result of those failures, Maestas requested 
remand of this matter in order to supplement the record with 
findings of fact regarding Waldron's criminal history. (See 
Appendix D hereto.) 
On remand, the trial court found that Waldron's prison file 
reflected the following: Waldron had been convicted of several 
counts of forgery, aggravated assault by a prison inmate and 
felony fleeing; his history included additional forgery-related 
convictions; he was suspected of smuggling drugs into the prison 
and had a history of hiding drugs on his person and otherwise 
possessing drugs while in the prison; he was found to have 
injection sites on his arm; and Waldron was never charged or 
disciplined in connection with a drug smuggling investigation 
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that began in the prison in November 1991. (R. 784-89.) Waldron 
was given a parole date of January 1993. (R. 785.) Yet, 
approximately two weeks after Waldron's involvement in the 
alleged transaction with Maestas, Waldron was paroled from 
prison. Waldron was paroled 9 months earlier than scheduled, on 
April 2, 1992. (R. 786.) Waldron's history presented credibility 
issues that should have been brought to the jury's attention 
during the trial of this matter. 
As a matter of law, failure to investigate constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel. A trial counsel's decision 
not to investigate the underlying facts of a case cannot be 
considered a valid tactical decision. State v. Huqqins, 920 
P.2d 1195, 1198 (Utah App. 1996). Gordon's trial performance was 
constitutionally deficient. 
The corroboration for Tony Waldron's version of what 
occurred inside the apartment consists of four witnesses: Allen, 
Lucey, Gabaldon, and Sundquist, none of whom were inside the 
apartment. While Allen stated that he observed one person leave 
the apartment, he could not describe the person. Allen's 
testimony does not support that Maestas remained in the apartment 
and/or engaged in a transaction. (R. 402-05.) In addition, Allen 
testified that the information he overheard on the wire during 
the alleged transaction was abstract and he could not remember 
what was said. Allen was unable to testify that based on what he 
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heard, Maestas was involved in a transaction. (R. 403-06.) 
Next, Lucey testified that he was aware that a "sale" had 
gone down when Waldron "relayed" that information to him. (R. 
388-89.) Lucey did not corroborate Waldron's testimony. Rather, 
he testified that he relied on Waldron's information and descrip-
tions to effectuate an arrest against Maestas. (R. 388-89.) 
Gabaldon's sole testimony linking Maestas to this crime and 
the events in the apartment is of hearsay statements made by 
Appleman. Appleman was actively and criminally involved in drug 
transactions. (R. 233-34.) Gabaldon testified at trial as 
follows: "[Appleman] came up to the car and she said - she 
pointed to Tony and she says, xwell, he already sold him 
cocaine.'" (R. 363.) Maestas was with another man when Appleman 
pointed. (Id.) The state claims Gabaldon's testimony supports a 
conviction against Maestas. Yet it is fraught with credibility 
and reliability concerns. 
Specifically, although no objection was made to the 
testimony, it constituted hearsay, which is not reliable 
evidence. State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1957) 
(hearsay is unreliable). Appleman's motives/credibility in 
implicating others were questionable due to her drug involvement. 
Gabaldon's hearsay testimony concerning Appleman's statements is 
not overwhelming evidence of a transaction involving Maestas. In 
addition, the testimony should have been objected to and 
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excluded, leaving no corroboration from Gabaldon whatsoever. 
Sundquist's corroboration lies in having seized evidence 
from Maestas which purportedly support the convictions in this 
case. Yet, the seized evidence fails to support all elements of 
the first degree felony offense for distributing a controlled 
substance within 1000 feet of a public school. (See R. 57 
(elements instruction).) 
Tony Waldron's testimony should have been disregarded 
entirely by the jury, if proper impeachment had been conducted by 
defendant's trial counsel. Corroboration was insufficient. 
Allen could not identify the occupants of the apartment or 
remember what was said. Lucey relied on Waldron's statement that 
a transaction had taken place. Gabaldon only offered hearsay 
statements which should not have been admitted. Sundquist's 
seizure was illegal and did not independently establish the 
elements of the offense for which Maestas was convicted. 
In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,188 (1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered defense counsel's failure to investigate 
the availability and testimony of certain witnesses, who would 
have presented information impacting on the credibility of the 
state's key witness. There, the Court ruled that the information 
was important because the key witness was the only person to 
offer "direct evidence of defendant's guilt." Id. "In reviewing 
this testimony, it is important to note that because it affects 
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the credibility of the only witness who gave direct evidence of 
defendant's guilt, the testimony affects the 'entire evidentiary 
picture.'" Id, 
Likewise, in this matter, the jury's verdict might have been 
different had the jury known the extent of Waldron's character 
for dishonesty and the extent of his motivation to implicate 
Maestas in the transaction. This court should grant certiorari 
and exercise its supervisory capacity in order to reverse 
defendant's conviction because of the clear departure by the 
court of appeals from the norms of appellate practice. 
POINT 2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADDRESS 
THE PLAIN ERROR OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO 
HEARSAY TESTIMONY SIMPLY BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED 
UNTIL DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF. 
Gabaldon's hearsay testimony regarding Appleman's statements 
is the only independent corroboration of Waldron's testimony (R. 
363.), yet the court of appeals did not address the failure of 
trial counsel to object, because "defendant did not raise this 
argument until his reply brief, which is too late." Maestas 2000 
UT App 022, n. 4, citing Burqandv v. State, 1999 Utah App. 95, n. 
1, 983 P.2d 586; Utah R. App. P. 24 (c). Burqandv cites directly 
to this court's opinion in Romrell v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 
N.A., 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980), which states the following: 
"As a general rule, an issue raised initially in a reply brief 
will not be considered on appeal ... Nevertheless, the Court, in 
its discretion, may decide a case upon any points that its proper 
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disposition may require, even if first raised in a reply brief." 
Bardeen v. Commander Oil Co., 48 Cal. App. 2d 355, 119 P.2d 967 
(1941). This court proceeds to decide the case in Romrell on the 
basis of an issue first raised in the reply brief. 
The Court of Appeals gives no heed to this Court's 
qualifying statement to the rule in Romrell at 395, instead 
refusing to address defendant's argument. The harm of trial 
counsel's deficiency in failing to investigate and impeach Tony 
Waldron is compounded by and linked to counsel's failure to 
object to Gabaldon's hearsay testimony. Testimony regarding 
Appleman's statements is clearly hearsay and inadmissible, is 
particularly damaging because it allegedly stems from defendant 
himself, and plainly demonstrates trial counsel's ineffectiveness 
and prejudice to defendant. This court should grant certiorari 
to review the court of appeals improper application of this 
court's ruling in Romrell. 
POINT 3. DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO RAISE 
THE ISSUE OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PLAIN 
HEARSAY UNTIL THE REPLY BRIEF DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COMPETENT REPRESENTATION ON APPEAL. 
Defendant's appellate counsel failed to raise the issue of 
the improper admission of Gabaldon's hearsay testimony until the 
reply brief. Because this error formed the basis of the court of 
appeals ruling on this issue, Maestas at n.4, this represents 
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 
10, SI 10, 386 Utah Adv. 57. This court should grant certiorari 
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to address the merits of defendant's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims at both the trial and appellate level. 
POINT 4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR'S ROLE IN CREATING A FALSE IMPRESSION TO THE JURY 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
During the trial of this matter in April 1993, the 
prosecutor asked Waldron if he was "presently an inmate at the 
Utah State Prison/' to which Waldron responded, "Yes, I am." (R. 
374.) The prosecutor then asked, "Directing your attention to 
the 14th of March of 1992, were you an inmate on that date?" 
Waldron answered, "Yes, I was." (R. 374.) During cross 
examination, Waldron indicated that in connection with his 
involvement in the undercover operation, correctional officers 
promised they would write a letter of "good recommendation to the 
board," and "that was it." (R. 379.) Neither the prosecutor nor 
Waldron disclosed that Waldron actually was released on parole 
nine months ahead of schedule and within approximately two weeks 
of his participation in the undercover operation. (R. 793). In 
fact, the prosecutor's examination improperly suggested that 
Waldron had not been released. Waldron never disclosed that he 
was actually paroled early, and the prosecutor allowed the 
improper suggestion to go to the jury that Waldron did not 
receive parole. The prosecutor specifically did not correct the 
suggestion left by his examination that Waldron was in prison 
from March 1992 to the date of trial. 
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"It is well settled that deliberate deception of a court and 
jurors by the presentation of known false evidence cannot be 
reconciled with the rudimentary demands of justice/' Campbell v. 
Reed, 594 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Pvle v. Kansas, 317 
U.S. 213 (1942)) (emphasis added). "The same result obtains when 
the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to 
go uncorrected when it appears." Id. (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). Here, "the prosecution allowed a 
false impression to be created at trial when the truth would have 
directly impugned the veracity of its key witness." Campbell, 
594 F.2d at 8 (citing U.S. v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239, 1243 (4th 
Cir. 1976)). 
The false impressions were allowed in this case to go 
uncorrected because Gordon failed to raise the matter to the 
trial court's attention. This Court should grant certiorari to 
review the court of appeals decision that the prosecutor's 
presentation of a false impression to the ]ury did not amount to 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
POINT 5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REVOKING 
DEFENDANT'S PROBATION. 
The court of appeals found that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in revoking defendant's probation. Maestas 
at f25. This conclusion is contrary to the law and the evidence. 
During the hearing on the matter, the state was required to 
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provide sufficient evidence to support a willful violation of 
probation. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 278 (Utah App. 1990). 
Tracy Anderson and Albert Nieto testified for the state. 
Anderson testified that the Odyssey House program was not 
equipped to deal with such mental health issues as suicidal 
ideation. (R. 618-19.) The problems related only to the mental 
health issues (R. 622-25); Maestas broke no other rules and was 
able to comply with the written/specific rules of the program. 
(R. 619; 621; 623-24.) Nieto admitted that Maestas also had 
accurately complained about ulcers, which proved to be untreated. 
(R. 629; 633-34.) 
With respect to whether Maestas willfully violated a rule, 
Nieto's testimony supports that he did not. Both witnesses 
acknowledged that the program could handle some level of 
"suicidal ideation/7 but that if it continued, the resident would 
not be allowed to participate in the program. (R. 618-20.) As 
the evidence reflects, Nieto believed that Maestas was not 
manipulative. (R. 632-33.) Simply, the Odyssey House program was 
not able to treat or monitor the mental health and medical issues 
presented by Maestas. 
In Hodges, the defendant was placed on probation. At an 
order to show cause for probation revocation, state witnesses 
testified that defendant had "physical and mental problems that 
interfered with his ability to effectively participate in 
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treatment/7 Id. at 272. In reversing the probation revocation, 
the court stated that where defendant's failure to progress in 
the program is beyond his control, probation cannot be revoked 
"unless it is also found that, because of this failure, appellant 
poses a present danger to others." Id. at 277. 
In this matter, the evidence presented at the order to show 
cause proceeding was insufficient to support a willful violation. 
Instead, the evidence supported that Maestas made bona fide 
efforts to meet the conditions of his probation, but suffered 
medical and mental issues that were beyond his control and not 
treatable in the Odyssey House program. 
Nothing in the record supports the determination that 
Maestas failed to make a bona fide effort to work within the 
parameters of the Odyssey House program. In accordance with the 
cases concerning probation revocation, the evidence was 
insufficient to support a willful violation. This court should 
grant certiorari in its supervisory capacity to address the court 
of appeals application of the facts of this case in relation to 
the prior holding in Hodges. 
POINT 6. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT 
DEFENDANT'S ARREST, WHICH DID NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW, WAS 
ILLEGAL, THEREBY INVALIDATING THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST. 
In this matter, the trial court justified the warrantless 
search as "incident to arrest." (R. 285.) Because the state 
failed to establish that the arrest was lawful, the warrantless 
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search cannot be upheld. This matter involved an operation 
initiated by the DOC. Correctional officers identified specific 
persons as the offending suppliers to the prison, and organized a 
drug purchase focusing on those persons in order to arrest them 
and to end the trafficking. (R. 239; 266-68; 284; 362-63; 385.) 
Correctional officers admitted the operation "had nothing to do 
with Maestas" (R. 239; ^ ee also 266-68; 362-63; 385), and the 
trial judge found that Maestas1 involvement m the matter was "an 
accidental happening." (R. 284.) Thus, at the time that 
correctional officers diverted from their intended operation, 
they were acting outside the scope of their authority under Utah 
law. 
Utah statutory law in effect in 1992 governed the DOC and 
its operations outside correctional facilities. The "duties" of 
the DOC were specifically limited to management of adjudicated 
offenders and the operation of correctional facilities. U.C.A. § 
64-13-10 (Supp. 1992). Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-la-l and 77-la-2 
specified that a ''corrections officer" only had "'peace officer 
authority" while engaged in the performance of his duties. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 77-la-l (Supp. 1992) and 77-la-2 (1990). 
The Utah Legislature amended Utah law governing the duties 
of the DOC in 1993. Because the events giving rise to the matter 
in this case occurred in 1992, the law in effect at that time is 
applicable to this Court's analysis. See State v. Fixel, 744 
19 
P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987). 
In Fixel, a Provo City police officer arranged and 
participated in a drug transactions in Pleasant Grove, Utah. 
Defendant argued that because the officer involved in the 
transaction was outside his nurisdictional limits at the time of 
the purchase, he acted beyond the scope of his authority. The 
Utah Supreme Court agreed Id. at 1368. 
In Maestas' case, if officers had complied with Utah 
statutory law, the search never would have occurred. Under Utah 
law, officers should have terminated the operation before it 
exceeded statutory limits. 
This Court should grant certiorari because the court of 
appeals improperly applied Utah statutory and case law in 
deciding the DOCs proper authority under the 1992 statute, and 
to properly address failure of trial counsel to suppress the 
evidence stemming from this illegal arrest. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should grant 
certiorari to review the court of appeals decision. 
SUBMITTED this day of ^2000. 
Nathan D. Pace, P.C. 
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner 
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ORME, Judge: 
*]l Defendant Tony R. Maestas appeals his convictions for drug 
offenses, arguing, first, that he received ineffective assistance 
of counsel at his jury trial, and second, that his arrest and the 
search that followed were illegal because Department of 
Corrections officers acted beyond the scope of their jurisdiction 
when they conducted an undercover operation outside the prison. 
Additionally, defendant appeals the revocation of his probation, 
asserting the trial court erred when it determined defendant 
willfully failed to comply with the terms of his probation. We 
conclude defendant has not met his burden on appeal and affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
*[2 Sometime in 1992, the Department of Corrections (DOC) 
launched an investigation aimed at cutting off the flow of 
illegal drugs into the Utah State Prison. DOC officials planned 
an undercover sting operation and enlisted the aid of an inmate 
1. Justice Wilkins heard the arguments in this case and 
participated in its resolution prior to his swearing-in as a 
member of the Utah Suoreme Court. 
to act as a confidential informant. The informant, posing as a 
prisoner out on work release, was to contact individuals on the 
outside whom DOC officials suspected were supplying drugs to 
work-release inmates. Defendant was not a suspected supplier and 
thus not an identified target of the sting operation. 
<l3 On March 14, 1992, the informant denned a "wire," and, 
accompanied by an undercover DOC officer, Teresa Gabaldcn, set 
about'to contact known drug dealers Patricia Chacon and Jeanette 
Appleman. Two other DOC officers, Kim Allen and Leo Lucey, 
monitored the conversations broadcast via the body wire, and 
observed many of the events from a surveillance van. 
*U The informant and Gabaldcn expressed to Appleman and Chacon 
their interest in purchasing illegal drugs, and the women 
responded by paging their supplier. The supplier still had not 
responded to the page, when, sometime later, Appleman and 
Gabaldcn went to a payphene to page the supplier again. As she 
left, Appleman mentioned that her brother's neighbor—who 
happened to be none other than defendant--could get drugs for 
her. Appleman indicated she had no way to contact defendant, but 
that he frequently dropped by. 
*J5 While Appleman and Gabaldcn were gene, defendant did in fact 
drop by, in the company cf another man. The informant told them 
Gabaldcn and Appleman were cut trying to contact their supplier 
because he, the informant, wanted to purchase drugs. Defendant 
then displayed a small bag cf cocaine and said, "I have this 
right here." The informant bought the cocaine for $100, and 
defendant left the apartment. 
1c The informant then came out cf Appleman's apartment, get 
into Gabaldcn's car, and gave her the cocaine he had just 
purchased. Armed peace officers were notified that the sale had 
been completed, and they stopped the car in which defendant was 
riding and arrested him. Incident to the arrest, one of the 
officers searched defendant and confiscated two separate 
substances, believed to be illegal drugs, and nearly $400 in 
cash. 
*!? Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance within 1000 feet cf a public school, a first 
degree felony in violation cf Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
(Supp. 1991) (currently codified at § 58-37-8(4)(a)(ix) (Supp. 
1999]), and possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1999). Defendant's case was tried to a jury, which found him* 
guilty on both counts. Thereafter, defendant was sentenced to 
statutory prison terms and fines, but execution of the prison 
sentences was stayed and defendant was placed on probation and 
ordered to complete the Odyssey House treatment program. 
*|8 Less than a month after his participation in the program 
began, defendant's probation officer filed a Progress/Violatic 
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Reoort informing the trial court that defendant had "become 
suicidal, homicidal, and had begun attacking staff and personnel 
at Odyssey House." The report was prompted by defendant's 
repeated suicidal "ideation" and a threat to assault his ex-wife. 
Odyssey House had warned defendant that, because it was not a 
psychiatric facility, defendant could not stay in the program if 
his suicidal inclination continued. 
1J9 Ac the hearing on the order to show cause why defendant's 
probation should net be revoked, the trial court heard testimony 
that defendant was capable of following the rules of Odyssey 
House. The court ultimately found that defendant had violated 
the conditions of his probation and that his "violation was 
knowing and intentional under circumstances where the defendant 
had the ability to comply with the Court's order on the 
conditions of probation." Defendant's probation was revoked, and 
he was ordered to serve his prison sentence. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
<]lQ Defendant raises three main issues on appeal.2 First, he 
argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his jury 
trial because trial counsel failed to imoeach the confidential 
2. It is noteworthy, as well as atypical, that we are deciding 
this appeal nearly eight years after the crime was committed. An 
explanation is in order. 
Defendant was charged by information on March 25, 1992, and 
was tried and convicted by a jury on April 28, 1993. After 
numerous continuances, he was sentenced in December of that year. 
A timely notice of appeal was filed, but his appeal was dismissed 
when prior counsel failed to file the required brief. 
Defendant's probation was revoked in September of 1994. 
Thereafter, in April of 1995, defendant, represented by new 
counsel, filed a Verified Rule 653 Petition for Relief from 
Conviction and Extraordinary Writ. In response, the trial court 
resentenced defendant on June 17, 1996, to allow him to pursue a 
direct appeal, which defendant timely did. However, nine months 
into the appeal, defendant filed a motion pursuant to Utah R. 
App. P. 23B, whereupon we remanded to the trial court for "entry 
of findings of fact regarding appellant's claim of ineffective 
assistance of his trial counsel." 
An evidentiary hearing was held and the trial court entered 
findings in November and December of 1997, which were filed in 
this court in January of 1998. Briefing was stayed, however, 
upon defendant's motion to further supplement the record. The 
supplemental record was filed in November of 1998, and briefing 
was finally completed in May of 1999. Oral argument was held 
September 27, 1999. 
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informant's credibility. Following our temporary remand, the 
trial court held a hearing pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure and made findings of fact relevant to 
defendant's claim. We defer to those factual findings, but 
determine as a matter of law "whether the defendant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment." State v Huccrins, 920 P. 2d 1195, 1198 (Utah Ct. 
Apo.), cert denied, 929 P.2d 350 (Utah 19 96). See State v 
Galleccs, 967 P.2d 9^3, 975-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Ill Defendant also argues tnat evidence seized m the search 
incident to his arrest snould have been suppressed because the 
arrest was illegal. He argues tne arrest violated his Fourtn 
Amendment rignts and exceeded tne scope of ECC's statutory 
authority. Because this issue was not raised below, defendant 
asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the trial 
court committed plain error. These are questions of law, which 
we review nondeferentially. See State v Simmons, 856 P 2d 614, 
613 fUtan Ct. App. 1993) ("Whetner police action implicates a 
fundamental violation of a defendant's rights is a question of 
law, which we independently review for correctness."); State v. 
Pixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (interpretation of 
statute is question of law reviewed for correctness) ; Galleccs, 
967 P.2d at 975-76 (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
raised for first time en appeal presents question of law) . 
*Il2 Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred when it 
revoked his pronation, finding defendant's violation of the terms 
and conditions of nis probation intentional and willful. The 
trial court's determinations underlying its conclusion that 
defendant violated his probation are findings of fact we will not 
disturo unless clearly erroneous, i.e., against tne clear weignt 
of tne evidence. See State v Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utan 1991).* Moreover, 
revocation of pronation is within the trial court's discretion. 
See State v Arcnuleta, 812 P.2d 30, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Therefore, we view tne evidence of a probation violation m a 
lignt most favoraole to tne trial court's findings and substitute 
our own judgment only if the evidence is so deficient as to 
render tne court's action an abuse of discretion. See State v. 
Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. ADD. 1994 . 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Hl3 Defendant argues he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment right because his 
trial counsel failed to investigate and impeach the credibility 
of the State's key witness, the confidential informant. The 
trial court held a Rule 23B hearing and made specific findings of 
fact regarding defendant's ineffective assistance claim. 
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<|14 Specifically, the trial court found that the confidential 
informant had been imprisoned on multiple counts of forgery and 
one count of fraud, and, while serving his sentence, had been 
disciplined numerous times for using drugs and smuggling them 
into the prison. A DOC assessment described the informant as an 
inmate who "cannot be trusted at all." Ke was under 
investigation for drug-related activities when he was asked to 
carticipate in DOC's investigation. An agent of the Department 
of Adult Probation and Parole was, for obvious reasons, of the 
opinion that "it would net be wise to allow him to participate." 
Nevertheless, the informant accepted the invitation, and, 
although a DOC investigator testified he was promised nothing in 
return ccher than a letter recommending that he not lose his 
parole date despite a "dirty" urinalysis, he was paroled on April 
2, 1992, less than one month after his participation in the 
investigation and more than nine months ahead of schedule.3 The 
drug-related activities for which he was under investigation 
before the sting operation resulted in no prison discipline or 
criminal charges. 
*|15 Defendant argues defense counsel's failure to discover these 
facts impugning the informant's credibility and to present them 
to the jury constitutes representation so deficient as to violate 
defendant's constitutional rights to competent representation and 
to confront the witnesses against him. However, in addition to 
shewing trial counsel made serious errors abridging his Sixth 
Amendment rights, defendant must also show counsel's errors 
3. In connection with this fact, defendant alleges prosecutorial 
misconduct, arguing the prosecutor left the jury with the 
impression that the informant had been an inmate in the Utah 
State Prison continuously from the time of his participation in 
the undercover operation through the time of trial. In reality, 
the informant was released shortly after the investigation and, 
by the time of trial, was again incarcerated on new charges. 
Defendant argues the prosecutor's questioning was improper 
because it concealed the fact that the informant was paroled 
early, possibly as a reward for his role in the investigation. 
We do not agree that the prosecutor's questioning of the 
informant rose to the level of presenting false evidence and 
decline to address this argument further. See State v. Carter. 
776 P. 2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989} (holding that appellate court "need 
not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, 
issue, or claim raised and properly before us on appeal"). See 
also id. (n[I]t is a maxim of appellate review that" the nature 
and extent of an opinion rendered by an appellate court is 
largely discretionary with that court."). Cf. Reese v. Reese, 
984 P.2d 937, 991 (Utah 1999) (to facilitate Supreme Court 
certiorari review, court of appeals must "at the very least 
identif[y] the basis for refusing to treat an issue"). 
961831-CA 5 
prejudiced him by depriving him of a fair trial and producing a 
verdict in which we have no confidence. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 465 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1S84). The 
State argues that even if counsel's performance was deficient, 
defendant has failed to show that trial counsel's failure to 
impeach the confidential informant prejudiced him. Because the 
informant's testimony was abundantly corroborated, we agree. 
<IlS The informant testified as follows: On March 14, 1S92, he 
and Gabaldcn attempted to contact individuals suspected of 
supplying drugs to prison inmates. He entered Appieman's 
apartment while Gabaldon remained in the car, and eventually 
defendant and another man came to the apartment looking for 
Appleman. When defendant learned that Appleman was cut trying to 
contact her supplier, defendant pulled out a small bag of cocaine 
and said, "I have this right here." Defendant then asked the 
informant if he was a cop, and the informant answered in the 
negative and told defendant he was out of prison on a home visit. 
Defendant's companion then left the apartment and the informant 
paid defendant S100 for the cocaine, whereupon the informant 
retired to the bathroom and told the listening agents over the 
wire that the transaction was complete and they should arrest 
"the two Mexicans that left the apartment building." At trial, 
the prosecutor shewed the informant a bag of cocaine and the 
informant identified it as the same or similar to the bag he 
bought from defendant. 
*Il7 The key elements of the informant's testimony were 
corroborated by other witnesses. First, defendant admitted that 
he was in Appieman's apartment that day. Further, Officer Leo 
Lucey, who was in charge of the investigation, testified that 
while monitoring the informant's "wire," he heard someone ask the 
informant what kind of drugs he wanted, followed by a discussion 
about money and the informant's report that the transaction was 
complete. Similarly, Officer Kim Allen, who was watching through 
a telescope, testified he saw two men who appeared to be Hispanic 
go into the apartment. Like Lucey, he heard discussion over the 
wire concerning the purchase of drugs and the amount to be paid. 
He testified he heard a nervous person ask the informant if he 
was a cop and the informant reply that he was out of prison on a 
release program. He also testified that one of the two Hispanic 
men left the apartment, and, thereafter, the informant stated 
over the wire that the transaction was complete and described 
defendant and his car. Sure enough, when the car was stopped, 
defendant had drugs and a considerable cash sum on his person. 
*jl8 Gabaldon's testimony even more convincingly corroborated the 
informant's version of events. She testified that when she and 
Appleman returned in the car from their attempt to contact 
Appieman's regular supplier from a payphone at a nearby 
convenience store, they saw defendant and his companion outside 
standing by a car. When Appleman saw the two men, she told 
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Gabaldon, "Well, there they are now. . . . I know I can get some 
stuff from them." Appleman got out of the car and approached 
defendant and his companion, while Gabaldon turned the car 
around. Appleman then came back to the car, gestured toward 
defendant,~and said, "Well, he already sold him cocaine."4 In 
addition, both Gabaldon and Officer Jeff Sundquist identified the 
bag of cocaine. 
<[19 We agree with the State that, even had the jury been 
apprised of the facts bearing on the informant's credibility, it 
would not have altogether disregarded his testimony because it 
was corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses. The 
failure of defendant's trial counsel to impeach the informant's 
credibility, then, dees not undermine our confidence in 
defendant's convictions. Having failed to show that the errors 
of his trial counsel resulted in prejudice, defendant's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. 
PROPRIETY OF THE DOC INVESTIGATION 
*]20 We turn new to defendant's challenge to DOC's authority to 
conduct the sting operation in which he was ensnared. Defendant 
argues DOC lacked authority to conduct undercover investigations 
outside the prison, and, in any event, should have looked the 
ether way when defendant happened onto the scene because 
defendant was not en the list of suspects targeted by the 
investigation. He argues his arrest was illegal and that the 
drugs and money seized in the search incident to the arrest 
should have been suppressed. Because these arguments were not 
raised at trial, defendant argues that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court 
committed plain error when it did not exclude the evidence sua 
spente. We disagree. 
*J21 DCC may "designate by policy which of its employees have 
the authority and powers of peace officers, the power to 
administer oaths, and other powers the department considers 
appropriate, including but not limited to the responsibility to 
bear firearms." Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-8 (1996)/ In 1992, 
DOC-designated peace officers, as state employees, had statewide 
peace officer authority. See 1937 Utah Laws ch. 69, § 9 ("Peace 
officers have statewide peace officer authority, but the 
authority extends to other counties, cities, or towns only when 
they are acting under Chapter 9, Title 77 [, i.e., are in fresh 
4. Counsel's failure to object to this testimony as hearsay was 
itself claimed to be ineffective assistance of counsel, but 
defendant did not raise this argument until his reply brief, 
which is too late. See Buraandv v. State, 983 P.2d 586, 588 n.l 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999); Utah R. ADD. P. 24(c). 
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oursuit.] This limitation does not apply to any peace officer 
employed by the state.'1) . It is undisputed than the DOC officers 
conducting the investigation in question were certified peace 
officers employed by a state agency. Given DOC's broad statutory 
license under section 64-13-8 to define the duties of its peace 
officers, and under the jurisdictional statute then in effect, 
which placed no intrastate geographic restrictions on DOC peace 
officer authority, the officers in this case acted within the 
scooe of their authority in pursuing the undercover 
investigation. Further* their authority was net somehow limited 
by their predetermined suspect list. When defendant walked into 
their trao, they had every right to adjust the focus of the 
investigation to account for such fortuity. Defendant was not 
cre;udiced by his trial counsel's failure to raise these issues 
a: trial, nor did the trial court commit error, plain or 
'-**• '*^°"""w ~ ^  ^r* this recrar c. 
PROBATION REVOCATION 
*J22 Finally, we address defendant's challenge to the trial 
court's determination that he violated the terms and conditions 
of his probation by "knowing[ly] and intentional[ly] " failing to 
comply with Odyssey House rules. Defendant had been told that 
Odyssey House was not a psychiatric facility and could not treat 
suicidal depression. He knew that he cculd not remain in the 
program if he continued to express suicidal thoughts. 
Nevertheless, defendant argues his failure to comply with this 
standard was not knowing and intentional, but was the product of 
mental illness. The trial ccurt disagreed, finding that 
defendant was capable :f controlling his suicidal thoughts and 
behavior ant that his probation violation was, accordingly, 
knowing and itentional. Defendant argues this z ndinc is 
clearly erroneous. 
*!23 A court may revoke probation if, upon Mbalanc[ing] the 
evidence, using discretion to weigh its importance and 
credibility, [it determines that] the probationer has more likely 
than not violated the conditions of probation." State v. Hodaes, 
795 ?.2d 270, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . We will not disturb the 
trial court's decision unless the court's findings are against 
the clear weight of the evidence and the probation revocation was 
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208-09 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
Moreover, we review the evidence before the court in a light 
favorable to the court's findings. See Peterson, 8S9 P. 2d at 
991; Martinez. 811 P.2d at 208." 
*i24 This court has previously held that "in order for a trial 
court to revoke probation based on a probation violation, the 
court must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
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violation was willful." Peterson, 869 P.2d at 991. Accord 
Hodges, 798 P. 2d at 277. However, "willful" in this context does 
not mean "intentional." Peterson. 869 P.2d at 991. "[A] 
finding of willfulness 'merely requires a finding that the 
probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions 
of his probation.'" Id. (quoting State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 
80, 84 "(Utah Ct. App. 199lf) . 
<J25 At defendant's revocation hearing, the clinical director of 
Odyssey House testified that defendant was capable of complying 
with the rules of the program. Similarly, a program counselor 
testified that defendant's suicidal "ideation" began as 
manipulative behavior that escalated into a frenzy. 3ased on the 
evidence before it, the trial court found a violation of 
probation "[tjhat . . . was knowing and intentional under 
circumstances where the defendant had the ability to comply with 
the Court's order." Defendant presented no evidence whatsoever 
on his own behalf. The testimony of the Odyssey House clinicians 
concerning defendant's ability to control his suicidal "ideation" 
was unccntroverted, and is sufficient to support the trial 
court's finding of a probation violation. The court did not 
abuse its discretion when it revoked defendant's probation. 
CONCLUSION 
*|26 We reject defendant's claims of error. Defendant was not 
prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to impeach the 
confidential informant. DCC did not exceed the scope of its 
statutory authority when it conducted the investigation outside 
the prison. The trial court properly revoked defendant's 
orcbaticn based on findings adecuatelv suoocrted bv the evidence. 
Gregory Orme, Judge 
<l2 8 WS CONCUR: 
^Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judce 
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Appendix B 
CHAPTER 13 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS — 
STATE PRISON 
Sunset Act — Section 63-55-264 provides that Chapters 13 and 13a, the Department of Cor-
rections, are repealed July 1, 1993. 
Section 
64-13-1. 
64-13-2. 
64-13-3. 
64-13-6. 
64-13-7. 
64-13-7.5. 
64-13-8. 
64-13-9. 
64-13-10. 
64-13-12. 
64-13-13. 
64-13-14. 
64-13-14.5. 
64-13-14.7. 
64-13-15. 
64-13-16. 
64-13-17. 
64-13-19. 
64-13-20. 
Definitions. 
Creation of department. 
Executive director. 
Purposes of department 
Offenders in custody of depart-
ment. 
Persons in need of mental 
health services — Contracts. 
Designation of employee 
powers. 
Repealed. 
Department duties. 
Assistance to sheriffs. 
Administrators. 
Secure correctional facilities. 
Limits of confinement place — 
Release status — Work re-
lease. 
Victim notification of offender's 
release. 
Property of offender — Storage 
and disposal. 
Inmate employment. 
Visitors to correctional facili-
ties — Correspondence. 
Labor at correctional facilities. 
Investigative services — Pre-
Section 
64-13-21. 
64-13-22. 
64-13-23. 
64-13-24. 
64-13-25. 
64-13-26. 
64-13-27. 
64-13-28. 
64-13-29. 
64-13-30. 
64-13-31. 
64-13-32. 
64-13-34. 
64-13-35. 
64-13-36. 
sentence investigations and 
diagnostic evaluations. 
Supervision of sentenced of-
fenders placed in community. 
Repealed. 
Offenders income and finances. 
Standards for staff training. 
Standards for programs. 
Private providers of services. 
Records — Access. 
Hearings involving staff or of-
fenders. 
Violation of parole or probation 
— Detention — Hearing. 
Expenses incurred by offenders 
— Payment to department. 
Emergencies. 
Discipline of offenders — Use of 
force. 
Safety of offenders. 
Items prohibited in correctional 
facilities — Penalties. 
Testing of prisoners for ADDS 
and HTV infection — Segre-
gation — Medical care — De-
partment authority. 
64-13-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Community correctional center" means a nonsecure correctional 
facility operated by the department. 
(2) "Correctional facility" means any facility operated fay the depart-
ment to house offenders, either in a secure or nonsecure setting. 
(3) "Council" means the Corrections Advisory Council. 
(4) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(5) "Emergency" means any riot, disturbance, homicide, inmate vio-
lence occurring in any correctional facility, or any situation that presents 
immediate danger to the safety, security, and control of the department. 
(6) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Corrections. 
(7) "Inmate" means amy person who is committed to the custody of the 
department and who is housed at a correctional facility or at a county jail 
at the request of the department. 
(8) "Offender" means any person who has been convicted of a crime for 
which he may be committed to the custody of the department and is at 
least one of the following: 
(a) committed to the custody of the department; 
(b) on probation; or 
(c) on parole. 
(9) "Secure correctional facility" means any prison, penitentiary, or 
other institution operated by the department or under contract for the 
confinement of offenders, where force may be used to restrain them if they 
attempt to leave the institution without authorization. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-1, enacted by L. tions (1) and (2) as present Subsections (4) and 
1985, ch. 198, § 1; 1987, ch. 116, § 1; 1989, (5). 
ch. 224, § 1. The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- 1989. added present Subsection (5) and redes-
ment added present Subsections (1), (2) and (6) ignated former Subsections (5) to (8) as Subsec-
through (8), and redesignated former Subsec- tions (6) to (9). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXJL — State prisoner s right to personally feet of Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons 
appear at avil trial to which he is a party— Act, 42 USCS §§ 1997-1997J, 93 A.L.R. Fed. 
state court cases, 32 A.LJL4th 1063. 706. 
Validity, construction, application, and ef-
64-13-2, Creation of department. 
There is created a Department of Corrections, under the general supervi-
sion of the executive director of the department. The department is the state 
authority for corrections and assumes all powers and responsibilities formerly 
vested in the Board of Corrections and the Division of Corrections in the 
Department of Human Services. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-Z, enacted by L. ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted 
1985, ch. 198, § 2; 1990, ch. 183, § 47. "Human Services'' for "Social Services" at the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- end of the second sentence. 
64-13-3. Executive director. 
(1) The executive director shall be appointed by the governor with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate. 
(2) The executive director shall be experienced and knowledgeable in the 
field of corrections and shall have training in criminology and penology. 
(3) The governor shall establish the executive director's salary within the 
salary range fixed by the Legislature in Title 67, Chapter 22, State OfEcer 
Compensation. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-3, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1991, added Subsection 
1985, ch. 198, § 3; 1991, ch. 114, § 20. (3). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
64-13-4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 64-13-4 (L. 1977, ch. diem and expense allowances of board mem-
253, § 4), relating to the oath, bond and per bers, was repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 102, § 17. 
64-13-4.1. Creation of Corrections Advisory Council. 
(1) There is created within the Department of Corrections a Corrections 
Advisory Council consisting of seven members. Each member shall be ap-
pointed by the governor for a term of four years, with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. Terms of the "council members shall be staggered, with no more 
than two terms expiring in any one year. Each council member shall be a 
resident of the state. No more than four members may be from the same 
political party and no member may hold any office connected with the Depart-
ment of Corrections. A vacancy occurring on the council for any reason shall 
be filled by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate for the 
unexpired term of the vacated member. 
(2) Membership of the council should be chosen to reflect: 
(a) geographical distribution; 
(b) expertise or personal experience with subject matters in the field of 
corrections; 
(c) diversity of opinion and political preference; and 
(d) gender, cultural, and ethnic diversity. 
(3) Council members may be appointed for no more than two consecutive 
terms unless the governor deems an additional term is in the best interest of 
the state. 
(4) Council members serve in a part-time capacity and without salary, but 
members shall receive a per diem allowance established by the director of the 
Division of Finance and all actual and necessary expenses incurred in the 
performance of official duties. 
(5) A member of the council may not hold any other office in the govern-
ment of the United States or of this state or of any municipal corporation 
within the state. 
(6) Any member may be removed at any time by the governor for official 
misconduct, habitual or wilful neglect of duty, or for other good and sufficient 
cause. 
(7) A council member shall disclose any conflict of interest to the council 
and if the conflict involves a direct or financial interest in either the subject 
under consideration or an entity or asset that could be substantially affected 
by the outcome of council action, the member shall refrain from voting on the 
matter. 
(8) Current members of the Board of Corrections shall continue in office as 
members of the Corrections Advisory Council until expiration of their terms 
and until their successors are chosen. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-4.1, enacted by L. Per diem rates and travel expenses. 
19S5, ch. 198. § 4. §§ 63-1-14.5, 63-1-15. 
Cross-References. — Governor's appoint-
ive power, Utah Const., Art. VTH, Sec. 10. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 72 CJ.S. Prisons § 5. 
Key Numbers. — Prisons *=» 4. 
64-13-5. Council duties. 
(1) The Corrections Advisory Council shall review and make recommenda-
tions to the executive director of the Department of Corrections concerning: 
(a) the role and responsibility of the department and its programs; 
(b) existing and proposed policies of the department; 
(c) the annual budget request for the department prior to submission to 
the governor, 
(d) development and implementation of master plans for the depart-
ment's programs and facilities, including facility siting; 
(e) any subject deemed appropriate by the council, except the council 
may not become involved in administrative matters; and 
(f) any subject concerning the department, as requested by the execu-
tive director. 
(2) The council shall encourage citizen awareness and input regarding pro-
grams in the field of corrections. 
(3) The council shall prepare an annual report for the governor and the 
Legislature on the status of the department and its programs. 
(4) The director of the department shall provide staff assistance and any 
information necessary for the Corrections Advisory Council to fulfill its re-
sponsibilities under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-5, enacted by L. enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 5, creating 
1985, ch. 198, § 5. division of corrections, and enacts the above 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, section, 
ch. 198, § 5 repeals former § 64-13-5, as 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 72 CJ.S. Prisons § 5. 
Key Numbers. — Prisons *» 4. 
64-13-6. Purposes of department 
The primary purposes of the Department of Corrections include: 
(1) protection of the public through institutional care and confinement, 
and supervision in the community of offenders where appropriate; 
(2) implementation of court-ordered punishment of offenders; 
(3) provision of program opportunities for offenders; 
(4) management of programs to take into account the needs and inter-
ests of victims, where reasonable; and 
(5) supervision of probationers and parolees as directed by statute and 
implemented by the courts and Board of Pardons. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-6, enacted by L. habilitation" and "for offenders'* for "to assist 
1985, ch. 211, § 1; 1987, ch. 116, § 2. the criminal offender in functioning as a law-
Amendment Notes, — The 1987 amend- abiding and productive member of society" in 
ment substituted "purposes" for "purpose" and Subsection (3); deleted former Subsection (4), 
"include" for "includes the following" m the in- which read "individualized treatment of the of-
troductory language; inserted "of offenders" in fender, and", redesignated former Subsection 
Subsection (1); substituted "offenders" for "the (5) as present Subsection (4); made punctua-
cnminal offender for the purpose of maintain- tion changes and added "and" to the end, in 
ing a law-abiding and productive society" in Subsection (4); and added present Subsection 
Subsection (2); substituted "program" for "re- (5). 
64-13-7, Offenders in custody of department 
All offenders committed for incarceration in a state correctional facility, for 
supervision on probation or parole, or for evaluation, shall be placed in the 
custody of the department. The department shall establish procedures and is 
responsible for the appropriate assignment or transfer of public offenders to 
facilities or programs. 
History: C. 1953. 64-13-7, enacted by L. ment substituted "correctional" for "prison" in 
1985, ch. 211, § 2; 1987. ch. 116. § 3. the first sentence. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
64-13-7.5. Persons in need of mental health services — 
Contracts. 
(1) Except as provided for in Subsection (2), when the department deter-
mines that a person in its custody is in need of mental health services, the 
department shall contract with the Division of Mental Health, local mental 
health authorities, or the state hospital to provide mental health services for 
that person. Those services may be provided at the Utah State Hospital or in 
community programs provided by or under contract with the Division of Men-
tal Health, a local mental health authority, or other public or private mental 
health care providers. 
(2) If the Division of Mental Health, a local mental health authority, or the 
state hospital notifies the department that it is unable to provide mental 
health services under Subsection (1), the department may contract with other 
public or private mental health care providers to provide mental health ser-
vices for persons in its custody. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-7.5, enacted by L. partment has determined to be" and made a 
1989, ch. 345, § 5; 1991, ch. 193, § 1. stylistic change in the first sentence in Subsec-
Amendment Notes, — The 1991 amend- tion (1); and inserted "or other public or pri-
ment, effective April 29t 1991, added the Sub- yate mental health care providers" and made 
section (1) designation and added Subsection related changes in the second sentence in Sub-
(2); substituted TExcept as provided for in Sub- section (1). 
section (2), when the department determines Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, eh. 245, § 8 
that a person in its custody is" for Tor persons
 m a k e s ^ ^ ^ ^ o n J u i u i m 
in the custody of the department who the de-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AJ-JL — Right of state prison authorities to to prisoner without his or her consent—state 
administer neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs cases, 75 A-LJL4th 1124. 
64-13-8. Designation of employee powers. 
The department shall designate by policy which of its employees have the 
authority and powers of peace officers, the power to administer oaths, and 
other powers the department considers appropriate, including but not limited 
to the responsibility to bear firearms. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-5, enacted by L. substituted "its" for "those" and "considers" for 
1985, ch- 211, § 3; 1987, ch. 116, § 4. "deems" and inserted "authority and" in the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- remaining sentence. 
ment deleted the former first sentence; and 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AJ-.R. — Probation officer's liability for 
negligent supervision of probationer, 44 
A.LR4th 538. 
64-13-9. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 116, 5 28 repeals § 4. relating to department services to other 
§ 64-13-9, as enacted by Laws 1985. ch. 211, agencies, effective April 27, 1987. 
64-13-10. Department duties. 
The department shall provide probation supervision programs, parole su-
pervision programs, correctional facilities, community correctional centers, 
and other programs or facilities as necessary and as required to accomplish its 
purposes. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-10, enacted by L. and "necessary and as required to accomplish 
1985, ch. 211, § 5; 1987, ch. 116, § 5. its purposes*' for "required for the safe manage-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
 m ent of public offenders." 
ment substituted "correctionaT for "prison" 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXJL — Constitutional right of prisoners 
to abortion services and facilities — federal 
cases, 90 AJ-JL Fed. 683. 
64-13-10-5, 64-13-11- Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1992, ch. 90, § 2 repeals April 27, 1992. For present comparable provi-
§ 64-13-10.5, as enacted by L. 1987, ch. 157, sions. see § 53A-1-403.5. 
§ 2, relating to education of persons in custody Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals § 64-13-11, 
of Department of Corrections, contracting for as enacted by Laws 1985, cfa. 211, § 6, reiaung 
services, transfer of supplies, equipment, furni- to evaluation programs, effective April 27, 
ture, and budget, and joint committee, effective 1987. 
64-13-12- Assistance to sheriffs. 
Where resources permit, the department may assist county sheriffs in the 
development of jail standards, in the review of jail facilities, and shall provide 
other services as requested by the sheriffs. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-12, enacted by L. sources permit" following 1)y the sheriffs" in 
1985, ch. 211, § 7; 1987, ch. 116, § 6; 1988, Subsection (1); and substituted "of for "for" 
ch. 100, § 2. preceding "an offender" in Subsection (2)1 a). 
Amendment Notes. - The 198/ amend-
 The 1 9 8 8 amendment, effective July 1, 1990, 
* ! £ ^ ^ 6 3 e C U O n m ? r 3 U r ? s e ^ 1 0 n s ; deleted former Subsection f 2), pertaining to re-
added vvhere resources permit to the begin- „ * L 
ning of Suosection 11), substituted "mav assist" ^u r semen t or a county for the incarceration 
for "shall assist" and "in the review of jail facil- o f a f e i o?- a n d deleted the Subsection 11) desig-
ities, and snail provide" for "review of facili- nation from the remaining paragraph, 
ties, and" and deleted "wnere availaoie re-
64-13-13. Administrators. 
The executive director shall appoint deputy directors, wardens, regional 
administrators, and other administrators as necessary to administer correc-
tional programs. Deputy directors, wardens, and regional administrators shall 
have experience in corrections, related criminal justice fields, law, or crimi-
nology, and experience in administration. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-13, enacted by L. punctuation change in the first sentence and 
1985, ch. 211, § 8: 1987, ch. 116, 4 7. deleted the former second sentence, authonz-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- ing the appointment of regional administrators 
ment inserted "wardens, regional admimstra- and wardens, 
tors, and other admimstra tors" and made a 
64-13-14. Secure correctional facilities, 
CD The department shall maintain and operate secure correctional facili-
ties for the incarceration of offenders. 
For each compound of secure correctional facilities, as established by the 
executive director, wardens shall be appointed as the chief administrative 
officers by the executive director. 
(2) The department may transfer offenders from one correctional facility to 
another and may, with the consent of the sheriff, transfer any offender to a 
county jail. 
History: C. 1963, 64-13-14, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
1985, ch. 211, § 9; 1987, ch. 116, § 8. ment rewrote this section. 
64-13-14.5. Limits of confinement place — Release status 
— Work release. 
(1) The department may extend the limits of the place of confinement of ail 
inmate when, as established by department policies and procedures, there is 
cause to believe the inmate will honor his trust, by authorizing him under 
prescribed conditions: 
(a) to leave temporarily for purposes specified by department policies 
and procedures to visit specifically designated places for a period not to 
exceed 30 days: 
(bj to participate in a voluntary training program in the community 
while housed at a correctional facility or to work at paid employment; 
(c) to be housed in a nonsecure community correctional center operated 
by the department; or 
(d) to be housed in any other facility under contract with the depart-
ment. 
(2) The department shall establish rules governing offenders on release 
status. A copy of the rules shall be furnished to the offender and to any 
employer or other person participating in the offender's release program. Any 
employer or other participating person shall agree in writing to abide by the 
rules and to notify the department of the offenders discharge or other release 
from a release program activity, or of any violation of the rules governing 
release status. 
(3) The willful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended limits of 
his confinement or to return within the time prescribed to an institution or 
facility designated by the department is an escape from custody. 
(4) If an offender is arrested for the commission of a crime, the arresting 
authority shall immediately notify the department of the arrest. 
(5) The department may impose appropriate sanctions upon offender's who 
violate rules, including prosecution for escape under Section 76-8-309 and for 
unauthorized absence. 
(6) An inmate who is housed at a nonsecure correctional facility and on 
work release may not be required to work for less than the current federally 
established minimum wage, or under substandard working conditions. 
History: C. 1953. 64-13-14.3, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 116, § 9. 
64-13-14,7. Victim notification of offender's release. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Offender" means a person who committed an act of criminally 
injurious conduct against the victim and has been sentenced to incarcera-
tion in the custody of the department. 
(b) frVictim" means a person against whom an offender committed 
criminally injurious conduct as defined in Section 63-63-2, and who is 
entitled to notice of hearings regarding the offender's parole under Sec-
tion 77-27-9.5. "Vict im' includes the legal guardian of a victim, or the 
representative of the family of a victim who is deceased. 
(2) (a) A victim shall be notified of an offender's release under Section 
64-13-14.5, or any other release to or from a half-way house, to a program 
outside of the prison such as a rehabilitation program, state hospital, 
community center other than a release on parole, commutation or termi-
nation for which notice is provided under Section 77-27-9.5, transfer of 
the offender to an out-of-state facility, or an offender's escape, upon sub-
mitting a signed written request of notification to the Department of 
Corrections. The request shall include a current mailing address and may 
include current telephone numbers if the victim chooses 
(b) The department shall advise the victim of an offender's release or 
escape under Subsection (2)(a), in writing. However, if written notice is 
not feasible because the release is immediate or the offender escapes, the 
department shall make a reasonable attempt to notify the victim by tele-
phone if the victim has provided a telephone number under Subsection 
(2)(a) and shall follow up with a written notice 
(3) Notice of victim rights under tins section shall be provided to the victim 
m the notice of hearings regarding parole under Section 77-27-9 5. The de-
partment shall coordinate with the Board of Pardons to ensure the notice is 
implemented 
(4) A victim's request for notification under tins section and any notifica-
tion to a victim under tins section is private information that the department 
may not release 
(a) to the offender under any circumstances: or 
(b) to any other party without the written consent of the victim. 
(5) The department may make rules as necessary to implement this section. 
(6) The department or its employees acting within the scope of their em-
ployment are not civilly or criminally liable for failure to provide notice or 
improper notice under tins secuon unless the failure or impropriety is willful 
or grossly negligent 
Historv- C. 1953, 64-13-14.7, enacted by L. came effective on April 29 1991, pursuant to 
1991. ch.' 11. 5 1. Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch 11 be-
64-13-15. Property of offender — Storage and disposal. 
(1) (a) Offenders may retain personal property at correctional facilities 
only as authorized by the department An offender's property which is 
retained by the department snail be inventoried and placed in storage by 
the department and a receipt for the property shall be issued to the of-
fender Offenders shall be required to arrange for disposal of property 
retained by the department within a reasonable time under department 
rules Property retained by the department shall be returned to the of-
fender at discharge, or m accordance with Title 75, Utah Uniform Probate 
Code, m the case of death prior to discharge 
(b) If property is not claimed within one year of discharge, or it is not 
disposed of by the offender within a reasonable time after the depart-
ment's order to arrange for disDosal, it becomes property of the state and 
may be used for correctional purposes or donated to a charity within the 
state 
(c* If an inmate s property is not claimed within one year of his death, 
it becomes the property of the state in accordance with Section 75-2-105. 
(d) Funds which are contraband and in the physical custody of any 
prisoner, whether in the form of currency and coin which are legal tender 
in any jurisdiction or negotiable instruments drawn upon a personal or 
business account, shall be subject to forfeiture following a hearing which 
accords with prevailing standards of due process. All such forfeited funds 
shall be used by the department for purposes which promote the general 
welfare of prisoners in the custody of the department. Money and negotia-
ble instruments taken from offenders' mail under department rule and 
which are not otherwise contraband shall be placed in an account admin-
istered by the department, to the credit of the offender who owns the 
money or negotiable instruments. 
(2) Upon discharge from a secure correctional facility, the department may 
give an inmate transition funds in an amount established by the department 
with the approval of the director of the Division of Finance. At its discretion, 
the department may spend the funds directly on the purchase of necessities or 
transportation for the discharged inmate. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-15, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211. § 10: 1987, ch. 116, § 10; 1988, 
ch. 191, § 1; 1991, ch. 124, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, in SuDsection 11), substituted references 
to "offender" for references to "inmate" 
througnout the subsection, substituted "per-
sonai prooerty at correctional facilities only as 
authorized" for "property only as is authorized" 
m the first sentence, made a punctuation 
change in the third sentence, substituted ''one 
year* for "two years" and "and may be used for 
correctional purposes or donated to a chanty 
within the state" for "consistent with the provi-
sions of Chapter 44. Title 78" m the fourth sen-
tence, and rewrote the last sentence: in Subsec-
tion (2). substituted "a secure correctional fa-
cility, the department may give an inmate" for 
"prison, inmates shall receive" in the first sen-
tence, substituted 'its discretion, the depart-
ment may spend the funds" for "the discretion 
of the department, the funds may be spent'* in 
the second sentence, and addea 'for the dis-
charged inmate' to the end of the subsection. 
The 1988 amendment, effective Apnl 25, 
1988, in Subsection (I) divided the subsection 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of prison 
regulation of inmates' possession of personal 
prooerty, 66 A.L R.4th 300. 
into the present paragraphs and added the des-
ignations: in Subsection (lKaj, inserted the 
third sentence and, in the fourth sentence, sub-
stituted at the beginning "Property retained by 
the department" for "The property": in Subsec-
tion t l)(b», inserted "or it is not disposed of by 
the offender within a reasonable time", and, m 
Subsection (l)iof deleted "held by the depart-
ment" following "instruments" at the end of 
the subsection. 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
1991. substituted "shall be required" for "may 
be required" in the third sentence and "in ac-
cordance with Title 75. Utah Uniform Probate 
Code" for "to the offenders legal representa-
tive" in the fourth sentence m Subsection 
(l)(a); deleted "death or" after "year or and 
inserted 'after the department's order to ar-
range for disDosar in Subsection (1Kb); and 
added present Subsection (l)(c) and the first 
two sentences in Subsection (l)(d) making for-
mer Suosection (lKc) the final sentence in Sub-
section • l)(d) and substituting "offenders' mail 
under department rule and which are not oth-
erwise contraband" for "offenders or from their 
mail under department rule" therein. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
64-13-16. Inmate employment 
Unless incapable of employment because of sickness or other infirmity or 
for security reasons, the department may employ inmates to the degree that 
funding and available resources allow An offender may not be employed on 
work which benefits any employee or officer of the department. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-16, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, § 11; 1987, ch. 116, § 11. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment substituted 'the aepartment may employ 
inmates to the degree that funding and avail-
able resources allow' for "* inmates shall be em-
History* C. 1953. 64-13-17, enacted bv L. 
1985. ch." 211. § 12: 1987. ch. 116. * 12. 
Amendment .Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment divided Simsection (l into present Suo-
sections <b(a) and 1(b) ana added present 
Sunsection <l)(c> in Subsection l;(a) suosti-
tutea "correctional" for 'state prison" near the 
beginning of the suosection. in Suosection (2), 
substituted *A oerson mav not' for "No person 
may' "oifenaer at any correctional facility" for 
AX.R. — Vanaitv and construction of prison 
regulation of inmates possession or personal 
proDertv 66 -V L R 4th 300 
ployed on a regular basis, as is practicable" at 
the end of the first sentence, substituted "An 
offenaer may nor/' for ''No inmate may" at the 
beginning of the second sentence, and deleted 
the former third, fourth, and last sentences. 
"inmate" and "under* for "those provided for 
in' m the first sentence, substituted "Of-
fenaers * for Inmates * and deleted "exercising" 
preceaing "visitation * in the second sentence, 
and aeieted the former third sentence as set 
out in the oound volume, and, in Subsection 
(3) suostituted "Offenders housed at any cor-
rectional facility' for Inmates" in the first 
sentence 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
64-13-17. Visitors to correctional facilities — Correspon-
dence, 
(1) (a) The following persons may visit correctional facilities without the 
consent of the department: the governor; attorney general, judges of the 
circuit, district, and appellate courts; members of the Corrections Advi-
sory Council: members of the Board of Pardons: members of the Legisla-
ture, and any other persons authorized under rules prescribed by the 
department or court order 
(b) Any person acting under a court order may visit or correspond with 
any inmate without the consent of the department. 
(c) The department may limit access to correctional facilities when the 
department or governor declares an emergency or when there is a not or 
other disturoance 
(2) A person may not visit with any offender at any correctional facility, 
other than under Subsection (1 \ without the consent of the department. Of-
fenders and all visitors may be required to suomit to a search or inspection of 
their persons and properties as a condition of visitation. 
(3) Offenders housed at any correctional facility may send and receive cor-
respondence, subject to the rules of the department. All correspondence is 
suDject to search, consistent with department rules. 
64-13-18. Sentence of incarceration. 
The officer delivering any offender for incarceration shall deliver to the 
department a certified copy of the sentence received by the officer firom the 
clerk of the court. The department shall give the officer a certificate of deliv-
ery and shall submit to the Board of Pardons a copy of the commitment order. 
The certified copy of sentence is conclusive evidence of the facts contained in 
it. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-18, enacted by L. to repair of damaged property, and enacts the 
1985, chu 211, § 13. above section. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, Cross-References. Pardons and paroles, 
en. 211, § 13 repeals former § 64-13-18, as Chapter 27 of Title 77. 
enacted by Laws 1977. en. 253, § 18, relating 
64-13-19. Labor at correctional facilities. 
The department shall determine the types of labor to be pursued, and what 
kind, quality, and quantity of goods, materials, and supplies shall be pro-
duced, manufactured, or repaired at correctional facilities. Contracts may be 
made for the laoor of offenders, including contracts with any federal agency 
for a project affecting national defense. As many offenders as practicable may 
be employed to produce, manufacture, or repair any goods, materials, or sup-
plies for sale to the state or its political subdivisions. Prices for all goods, 
materials, and supplies shall be fixed by the department. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-19, enacted by L. "the prisons'' at the end of the first sentence 
1986, ch. 211, § 14: 1987, ch. 116, § 13. and "offenders" for "inmates" in the second and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- third sentences, and inserted "sale to" in the 
ment substituted "correctional facilities" for third sentence 
64-13-20- Investigative services — Presentence investiga-
tions and diagnostic evaluations. 
(1) The department shall. 
(a) provide investigative and diagnostic services and prepare reports 
to. 
(l) assist the courts in sentencing; 
(u) assist the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibili-
ties regarding offenders, 
(in; assist the department m managing offenders; and 
(IVJ assure the professional and accountable management of the 
department, 
(b) establish standards for providing investigative and diagnostic ser-
vices based on available resources, giving priority to felony cases; 
(c) employ staff for the purpose of conducting* 
d) thorough presentence investigations of the social, physical, and 
mental conditions and backgrounds of offenders; 
(u) examinations when required by the court or Board of Pardons; 
and 
(mj thorough diagnostic evaluations of offenders as the court finds 
necessary to supplement the presentence investigation report under 
Section 76-3-404 
(2) The department may provide recommendations concerning appropriate 
measures to be taken regarding offenders 
(3) (a) The presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports 
prepared by the department are confidential as defined in Section 77-18-1 
and after sentencing may not be released except by express court order or 
by rules made by the Department of Corrections 
(b) The reports are intended only for use by 
d) the court in the sentencing process, 
(n) the Board of Pardons m its decision-making responsibilities; 
and 
(in; the deoartment in the supervision, confinement, and treat-
ment of the offender 
(4) Presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports shall be 
made available upon request to other correctional programs within the state if 
the offender who is the subject of the report has been committed or is being 
evaluated for commitment to the facility for treatment as a condition of proba-
tion or parole. 
(5) (a) The presentence investigation reports shall include a victim impact 
statement in all felony cases and in misdemeanor cases if the defendant 
caused bodily harm or death to the victim. 
(b) Victim impact statements shall: 
(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense; 
(iii) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered 
by the victim as a result of the offense, and the seriousness and 
permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or famil-
ial relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the 
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that the court requires. 
(6) If the victim is deceased; under a mental, physical, or legal disability; or 
otherwise unable to provide the information required under this section, the 
information may be obtained from the personal representative, guardian, or 
family members, as necessary. 
(7) The department shall employ staff necessary to pursue investigations of 
complaints from the public, staff, or offenders regarding the management of 
corrections programs. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-20, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, § 15; 1987, ch. 116, $ 14; 1991, 
ch. 206, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated Subsections il) through (3) 
as present Suosections il)(a> through U)(c/, 
Subsection (4) as present Subsections (l)<d) 
througn (l)(f), and Subsection <5J as present 
Subsection (2), resoectively, designated the for-
mer introductory language as the introductory 
language of present Suosection (1); substituted 
"investigative services" for "investigative func-
tions/ ""to assist" for "'functions, and" preced-
ing "the Board of Pardons" and "offenders" for 
"the offender* and inserted "to assist" preced-
ing "the department" in the introductory lan-
guage of Subsection (1): deleted "subject to the 
limitations of Suosection 64-13-15 <D" from 
the end of the first sentence of Subsection 
(1Kb), substituted 'regarding'' for "on behaif 
of in the second sentence of Subsection (1Kb); 
deleted the former third sentence of Subsection 
(1Kb) as set out m the bouna volume; rewrote 
Suosection (l)(c): deleted "the defendant, his 
attorney, the state's attorney, and" preceding 
"other correctional programs" in Subsection 
(l)(d); redesignated Subsections (4)(ai through 
(4)(f) as present Subsections (D(eKi) through 
(D(eKvi); substituted "and" for "along with" in 
Subsection 'D(etfiii). 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
1991, rewrote Subsection (1) as Suosections (1) 
through (6), adding or changing the subsection 
designations, adding Suosections f l)(c)(iii) and 
(3)(b), inserting references to "diagnostic ser-
vices" in Subsections <!)(ai and (l)(b), inserting 
references to "presentence diagnostic evalua-
tion and investigation reports" in Suosections 
(3)(a) and i4), suostitutmg the language begin-
ning with "as denned" in Subsection (3)(a) for 
"under Chapter 2, Title 63, regarding informa-
tion practices." and making several stylistic 
changes throughout Subsections (I) through 
(6). and redesignated Suosection (2) as Subsec-
tion <7). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 
(Utah CL App. 1989). 
64-13-21. Supervision of sentenced offenders placed in 
community. 
The department, except as otherwise provided by law, shall supervise sen-
tenced offenders placed in the community on probation by the courts, on pa-
role by the Board of Pardons, or upon acceptance for supervision under the 
terms of the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Proba-
tioners. Standards for the supervision of offenders shall be established by the 
department, giving priority, based on available resources, to felony offenders. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-21, enacted by L. ment rewrote the first sentence and made a 
1985, ch. 211, § 16; 1987, ch. 116, § 15. minor phraseology change in the second sen-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- tence. 
64-13-22. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals § 17, relating to community-based programs, 
§ 64-13-22, as enacted by Laws 1985. ch. 211, effective April 27, 1987. 
64-13-23. Offender's income and finances. 
The department may require each offender, while in the custody of the 
department or while on probation or parole, to place funds received or earned 
by him from any source into an account administered by the department or 
into a joint account with the department at a federally insured financial 
institution. 
(1) The department may require each offender to maintain a minimum 
balance in either or both accounts for the particular offender's use upon 
discharge from the custody of the department or upon completion of pa-
role or probation. 
(2) If the funds are placed in a joint account at a federally insured 
financial institution: 
la) any interest accrues to the benefit of the offender account; and 
(b) the department may require that the signatures of both the 
offender and a departmental representative be submitted to the fi-
nancial institution to withdraw funds from the account. 
(3) If the funds are placed in an account administered by the depart-
ment, the department may by rule designate a certain portion of the 
offender's funds as interest-bearing savings, and another portion as non-
interest-bearing to be used for day-to-day expenses. 
(4) The department may withhold part of the offender's funds in either 
account for expenses of incarceration, supervision, or treatment: for court-
ordered restitution, reparation, fines, alimony, support payments or simi-
lar court-ordered payments; for department-ordered restitution; and for 
any other debt to the state. 
(5) (a) Offenders shall not be granted free process in civil actions, in-
cluding petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, if, at any time from the 
date the cause of action arose through the date the cause of action 
remains pending, there are any funds in either account which have 
not been withheld or are not subject to withholding under Subsection 
(3) or (4). 
(b) The amount assessed for the filing fee, service of process and 
other fees and costs shall not exceed the total amount of funds the 
offender has in excess of the indigence threshold established by the 
department but not less than S25 including the withholdings under 
Subsection (3) or (4) during the identified period of time. 
(c) The amounts assessed shall not exceed the regular fees and 
costs provided by law. 
(6) The department may disclose information on offender accounts to 
the Office of Recovery Services and other appropriate state agencies. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-23, enacted by L. ceived or earned by him from any source" for 
1987, ch- 116, § 16; 1991, en. 125, § 1; 1992, "his income from employment while in the cus-
ch. 217, § 1. tody of the department or while on probation or 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1987, parole" in the introductory paragraph and de-
ch. 116, § 16 repeals former § 64-13-23, as en- leted "in its discretion" after "department 
acted by Laws 1985, ch. 211. § 18, relanng to may" m Subsection (5). 
compensation for inmate employment, and The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
enacts the present section. 1992. inserted "the funds are" after "IT* in Sub-
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- sections i2) and (3); made a stylistic cnange in 
ment. effective Apni 29, 1991. inserted "while Subsection (4); added Subsection (5); and redes-
m the custody of the department or while on ignatec former Subsection t5) as Subsection 
probation or parole" and suDsntuted "funds re- (6). 
64-13-24. Standards for staff training. 
To assure the safe and professional operation of correctional programs, the 
department shall establish policies setting minimum standards for the basic 
training of all staff upon employment, and the subsequent regular training of 
staff. The training standards of correctional officers who are designated as 
peace officers shall be not less than those established by the Peace Officer 
Standards and Training Council. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-24, enacted by L. and made a punctuation change in the first 
1985, ch. 211, § 19: 1987, ch- 116, § 17. sentence, and inserted "correctional officers 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- wno are designated as" and substituted "shall 
ment substituted "staff upon employment" for be not" for "may not be' in the second sentence, 
"newly employed staff." inserted "suDsequent." 
64-13-25- Standards for programs. 
(1) To promote accountability and to ensure safe and professional operation 
of correctional programs, the department shall establish minimum standards 
for the organization and operation of its programs. 
(a) The standards shall be promulgated according to state rulemaking 
provisions. Those standards that apply to offenders are exempt from the 
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46a. the Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act. Offenders are not a class of persons under that act. 
(b) Standards shall provide for inquiring into and processing offender 
complaints. 
(2) There shall be an audit for compliance with standards according to 
policies and procedures established by the department, for continued opera-
tion of correctional programs. 
(a) At least every three years, the department shall internally audit all 
programs for compliance with established standards. 
(b) All financial statements and accounts of the department shall be 
reviewed during the audit. Written review shall be provided to the man-
agers of the programs and the executive director of the department. 
(c) The reports shall be classified as confidential internal working pa-
pers and access is available at the discretion of the executive director or 
the governor, or upon court order. 
History: C. 1953, S4-13-25, enacted by L. 
1985, ciL 211, § 20; 1987, ch- 116, § 18. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "its" for "the" near the end of 
the introductory paragraph of Subsection (1); 
deleted "and shall encompass all aspects of the 
department operations" from the end of the 
first sentence of Subsection (IMSLK added the 
second sentence of Subsection fl)(aj; deleted "a 
means of* preceding "inquiring" in Subsection 
(l)(br, substituted "There snail be an audit for" 
for "Certification of and a comma for "is re-
64-13-26. Private providers 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-26, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, § 21; 1987. ch- 116, § 19; 1989, 
ch. 224, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "The department may con-
tract" for "Nothing in this chapter prohibits 
the department from contracting" and "re-
viewed for compliance with standards set by 
the department" for "certified u> be m compli-
ance with the departmental standards" in the 
first sentence, added "and annually thereafter" 
to the end of the first sentence, and added the 
second and third sentences. 
quired" in the introductory paragraph of Sub-
section (2); substituted "three years" for "two 
years" and "for compliance" for "and certify 
f compliance or noncompliance" in Subsection 
» (2)(a); substituted "available at the discretion 
1
 of the executive director or the governor, or 
- upon court order" for "governed by the State 
• Information Practices Act" in Subsection (2)(c;; 
L
 and deleted former Subsection (2)(d), denying 
, certification to programs not complying with 
standards. 
of services. 
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
1989, designated the first sentence as present 
Subsection (1); deleted "if the programs are re-
viewed for compliance with standards set by 
the department within six months after com-
mencing operation and annually thereafter" at 
the end of Subsection (1); added Subsection 
(2)(ar, designated the former second sentence of 
the section as Subsection t2)(b); and designated 
the former third sentence of the section as Sub-
section (2)(o and inserted "to records regard-
ing the reviews" therein. 
(1) The department may contract with private providers or other agencies 
for the provision of care, treatment, and supervision of offenders committed to 
the care and custody of the department. 
(2) la) The department shall: 
(i) establish standards for the operation of the programs; and 
(ii) annually review the programs for compliance. 
(b) The reviews shall be classified as confidential internal working 
papers. 
(c) Access to records regarding the reviews is available upon the discre-
tion of the executive director or the governor, or upon court order. 
64-13-27. Records — Access, 
(1) (a) The State Bureau of Criminal Identification, county attorneys' of-
fices, and state and local law enforcement agencies shall furnish to the 
department upon request a copy of records of any person arrested in this 
state. 
(b) The department shall maintain centralized files on all offenders 
under the jurisdiction of the department and make the files available for 
review by other criminal justice agencies upon request in cases where 
offenders are the subject of active investigations. 
(2) All records maintained by programs under contract to the department 
providing services to public offenders are the property of the department. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-27, enacted by L. and, in Subsection (2), deleted "and shall be 
1985, ch. 211, § 22; 1987, ch. 116, § 20; 1989, returned to it when the offender is terminated 
ch. 224, § 3. from the program" at the end of the present 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- provision and a second sentence that read The 
ment deleted "public'' preceding "offenders" in department shall maintain an accurate audit 
the second sentence of Subsection (2).
 Tecord o f information provided to other pro-
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, ^ ^
 o r l e s r e g a r d i n g offenders under 
1989. aesignated the first and second sentences -^ impaction " 
of Subsection (1) as Subsections (1)(a) and lb) 
64-13-28. Hearings involving staff or offenders. 
(1) The department shall maintain an administrative hearing office to con-
* duct hearings regarding offenders in the custody of the department, issues 
involving staff, or any other administrative matters as assigned by the execu-
tive director of the Department of Corrections. The hearing officer may issue 
subpoenas, compel attendance of witnesses and the production of books, pa-
pers, and other documents, administer oaths, and take testimony under oath. 
(2) The hearing officer shall maintain a summary record of all hearings and 
provide timely written notice to participants of the decision and the reasons 
for the decision. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-28, enacted by L. the first sentence of Subsection (1), substituted 
1985, ch- 211. § 23; 1987, ch. 116, § 21; 1988, hearings regarding offenders in the custody of 
ch- 191, § 2. the department, issues involving staff, or any 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- other administrative matters as assigned by 
ment substituted "may issue" for "shall be ap- the executive director of the Department of 
pointed by the executive director and has the Corrections" for "investigative hearings re-
power to issue" in the second sentence. garding offenders under supervision, staff mat-
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, ters in dispute, or other administrative mat-
1988, divided the former provisions into ters in dispute"; and, in Subsection (2), in-
present Subsection ll) and Subsection (2): in serted "timely." 
64-13-29- Violation of parole or probation — Detention — 
Hearing. 
(1) The department shall ensure that the court is notified of violations of 
the terms and conditions of probation in the case of probationers under the 
department's supervision, or the Board of Pardons in the case of parolees 
under the department's supervision. In cases where the department desires to 
detain an offender alleged to have violated his parole or probation and where 
it is unlikely that the Board of Pardons or court will conduct a hearing within 
a reasonable time to determine if the offender has violated his conditions of 
parole or probation, the department shall hold an administrative hearing 
within a reasonable time, unless the hearing is waived by the parolee or 
probationer, to determine if there is probaDle cause to believe that a violation 
has occurred. If there is a conviction for a crime based on the same charges as 
the probation or parole violation, or a finding by a federal or state court that 
there is probable cause to believe that an offender has committed a crime 
based on the same charges as the probation or parole violation, the depart-
ment need not hold its administrative hearing 
(2) The appropriate officer or officers of the department shall, as soon as 
practical following the department's administrative hearing, report to the 
court or the Board of Pardons, furnishing a summary of the hearing, and may 
make recommendations regarding the disposition to be made of the parolee or 
probationer Pending any proceeding under this section, the department may 
take custody of and detain the parolee or probationer involved for a period not 
to exceed 72 hours excluding weekends and holidays. 
(3) If the hearing officer determines that there is probable cause to believe 
that the offender has violated the conditions of his parole or probation, the 
department may detain the offender for a reasonable period of time after the 
hearing or waiver, as necessary to arrange for the incarceration of the of-
fender Written order of the department is sufficient authorization for any 
peace officer to incarcerate the offender The department may promulgate 
rules for the implementation of this section 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-29, enacted by L. suant to' ana deleted "prior to the hearing" 
1985, ch. 211, § 24: 1987, cix. 116,^ 22. following "holidays' in the second sentence of 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- Subsection (2) substituted 'the hearing officer 
ment divided the section into suDsections, sub- determines that there is probable cause to be-
stitutec "violations" for Tanv violation," fpro- i i e v e ^ ±e offender aas violated the condi-
bation' for 'supervision/ "prooationers under
 a o n s o f ^ D a r m e o r p r o b a t l o I L ±e department 
the deoarnnent
 a tor prooation offenders un- m a v a e c a i n c h e o f f ender» f o r - l t a p p e a r s * ^ 
derprtDoation and paroiees under the deoart-
 h o f f i c e r Qr o f f i c e r s ^ ^ ^ Qr 
ment s tor offenders under parole in the tirst , , , „ - „
 k, , 
sentence of Suosection 1. substituted the Ian- reinca™^°* * i ^ y to follow the oaroiee 
guage beginning Tn cases wnere the depart- or probationer may be detained and tncarcer-
ment desires' and ending "his conditions of pa- a n o n o f the ^offender for retaking or 
role or pronation * for Trior to giving anv noti- reincarceration in the first sentence of Sub-
ficanon' and "proDable cause" for reasonable ^ecaon 3) ^  substituted "incarcerate the of-
cause' in the second sentence of Suosection (1) fender" for "effect retaking or reincarceration" 
added the third sentence of Suosection 11), sub- m ^ e second sentence of Suosection (3), and 
stituted 'the department s administrative subsatuted "may promulgate rules" for "is an-
nealing" for "termination of anv hearing'* and thonzed to Dromulgate appropnate policies 
"mav mane* for fmaking" in the first sentence and procedures" in the last sentence of Subsec-
of Subsection (2) substituted "under* for "pur tion (3) 
64-13-30- Expenses incurred by offenders — Payment to 
department, 
(1) The department shall establish and collect from offenders on work re-
lease programs reasonable costs of maintenance transportation, and inciden-
tal expenses incurred oy the deDartment on behalf of the offenders Priority 
shall be given to restitution and family support obligations. 
(2) The department, under its rules, may advance funds to any offender as 
necessary to establish the offender m a work release program. 
History: C. 1963, 64-13-30, enacted by L. (1) and substituted "its rules'9 for "rules it pre-
1985, cn~ 211, § 25; 1987, cJbu 116, § 23. scribes" and made a punctuation change in 
Amendment Notes- — The 1987 amend- Subsection (2). 
ment deleted the second sentence of Subsection 
64-13-31. Emergencies. 
In the case of riots, disturbances, or other emergencies at correctional facili-
ties, the Department of Corrections has authority to direct the resolution of 
the emergencies. The department may request and coordinate the assistance 
of other state and local agencies in responding to the emergencies. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-31, enacted by L. ment substituted nat" for "in" preceding "cor-
1985, ch. 211, § 26; 1987, ch. 116, § 24. rectional facilities" in the first sentence. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
64-13-32. Discipline of offenders — Use of force. 
If an offender offers violence to an officer or other employee of the Depart-
ment of Corrections, or to another offender, or to any other person; attempts to 
damage or damages any corrections property; attempts to escape: or resists or 
refuses to obey any lawful and reasonable command; the officers and other 
employees of the department may use all reasonable means, including the use 
of weapons, to defend themselves and department property and to enforce the 
observance of discipline and prevent escapes. An inmate in the act of escaping 
from a secure correctional facility is presumptive evidence that he poses a 
threat of death or serious bodily injury to an officer or others if apprehension 
is delayed. 
History: C. 1963, 64-13-32, enacted by L. ment substituted "offender, or to any" for "in-
1985, en. 211, § 27; 1987, ch- 116, § 25. mate or" and made punctuation changes in the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- first sentence and added the second sentence. 
64-13-33- Restitution for offenses-
Following an administrative hearing, the department is authorized to re-
quire restitution from an ofiFender for expenses incurred by the department as 
a result of the offender's violation of department rules. The department is 
authorized to require payment from the offender's accoimt or to place a hold 
on it to secure compliance with this section. 
History: C. 1963, 64-13-33, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, 3 28. 
64-13-34. Safety of offenders. 
In case of disaster or acts of God that threaten the safety of inmates or the 
security of a secure correctional facility, inmates may be moved to a suitable 
place of security. Inmates shall be returned to a correctional facility as soon as 
it is practicable. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-34, enacted by L. who are ill shall receive necessary medical care 
1985, ch. 211, § 29; 1987, ch. 116, § 26. and attention" following "place of security" in 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- the first sentence; and substituted ,fa correc-
ment substituted ''a secure correctional facil- tional facility" for "the prison*' and "practica-
ity" for ""the prison" and deleted ""where those ble" for "safe" in the second sentence. 
64-13-35. Items prohibited in correctional facilities — Pen-
alties. 
(1) Except as provided by department policy, no firearm, dangerous 
weapon, implement of escape, explosive, drug, spirituous or fermented liquor, 
medicine, or poison may be: 
(a) transported to or upon a correctional facility or its appurtenant 
grounds; 
(b) sold or given away at any correctional facility or in any building 
appurtenant to a secure correctional facility, or on land granted to the 
state for the use and benefit of the department; or 
(c) given to, or used by, any offender at a correctional facility. 
(2) (a) Any person who transports to or upon a correctional facility or its 
appurtenant grounds any firearm, dangerous weapon, implement of es-
cape, or explosive, with intent to provide or sell it to any offender, is 
guilty of a second degree felony. 
(b) Any person who provides or sells to any offender at a correctional 
facility any firearm, dangerous weapon, implement of escape, or explo-
sive, is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(c) Any offender who possesses at a correctional facility any firearm, 
dangerous weapon, implement of escape, or explosive, is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "drug" means any chemical or physical sub-
stance in any of its physical or chemical states as defined in the Controlled 
Substances Act. 
(4) Penalties for drug violations under this section are as provided in Sec-
tion 58-37-3, Controlled Substances Act. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-35, enacted by L. "secure correctional facility" for "prison." and 
1985, ch. 211, § 30; 1987, ch. 116, § 27; 1990. "the department" for "prisons" in Subsection 
ch. 238, § 1. (l)(b>; substituted "offender at a correctional 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- facility" for "inmate in the prison except under 
ment substituted "by department policy, no direction of department medical authorities" in 
firearm, dangerous weapon, explosive" for "in Subsection (l)(c:; and rewrote Subsection (2). 
Subsection (2), no" and made a punctuation
 T h e 1 9 9 0 amendment, effective April 23. 
change in the introductory language of Sudsec-
 1 9 9 0 i n s e n e d ^JDDlment o f e s c a D e* though. 
tion (1); substituted a correctional facility or „ „, , , , ,
 c u„™;„« , <\ 
.. _ • . . , « , out this section and aaded Subsection 14). its appurtenant grounds tor corrections
 n _, . c 
premises" in Subsection ,l)(a>; substituted "at Cross-Rererences. - Sentencing 
any correctional facility for "in any prison", * * • §§ 7 M - 2 0 1 - 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 3 ' 76-3'301' 
64-13-36. Testing of prisoners for AIDS and HIV infection 
— Segregation — Medical care — Department au-
thority. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) ''Prisoner" means a person who has been adjudicated and found 
guilty of a criminal offense, who is in the custody of and under the juris-
diction of the department. 
(b) "Test" or "testing" means a test or tests for Acquired Immunodefi-
ciency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection in accor-
dance with standards recommended by the Department of Health. 
(2) (a) Within 90 days after July 1, 1989," the effective date of this act, the 
department shall test or provide for testing of all prisoners who are under 
the jurisdiction of the department, and subsequently test or provide for 
testing of all prisoners who are committed to the jurisdiction of the de-
partment upon admission or within a reasonable period after admission. 
(b) At the time that test results are provided to persons tested, the 
department shall provide education and counseling regarding Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus infec-
tion. 
(3> (a) The results of tests conducted under Subsection (2) shall become 
part of the inmate's medical file, accessible only to persons designated by 
the department by rule, and in accordance with any other legal require-
ment for reporting of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus infection. 
(b) Medical and epidemiological information regarding results of tests 
conducted under Subsection (2) shall be provided to the Department of 
Health. 
(4) (a) The department shall house prisoners who test positive for Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infec-
tion in a single cell or room or provide for segregation of that person from 
members of the prison population. No person who tests negative for Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
infection may be placed or housed in a cell or room with a person who has 
tested positive for either of those conditions, except upon his written 
request. 
(b) The department shall provide reasonable and adequate medical 
care for members of the prison population who test positive for Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infec-
tion. 
(o The department has authority to take action with regard to any 
prisoner who has tested positive for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection, as it deems reason-
able and necessary for the safety and security of the prison population 
and prison staff. 
(d) This subsection does not require or suggest that prisoners who test 
positive for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunode-
ficiency Virus infection be placed in separate cell blocks or cell areas 
separate from the general prison population, unless such separation is 
medically necessary for the protection of the general prison population or 
staff. 
(ej Prisoners who test positive for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection may not be excluded 
from common areas of the prison that are accessible to other prisoners, 
solely on the basis of that condition, unless it is medically necessary for 
protection of the general prison population or staff. 
(5) If the department complies with Subsections (2), (3), and (4) it shall be 
considered to have discharged its duty and to have taken reasonable and 
necessary precautions to prevent transmission of Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-36, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, cfa. 234, § 2 
1989, ch. 234, § 1. makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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Section Section 
of order — Redaction — Receipt 77-18-15. Retention of expunged records — 
of order — Administrative pro- Fee — Agencies. 
ceedings — Division require- 77-18-16. Penalty. 
ments. 77-18-17. Retroactive application. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termina-
tion, revocation, modification, or extension — 
Hearings. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court, 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the Department of Corrections. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has 
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and 
presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the 
department. These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to 
determine what level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the Department 
of Corrections. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
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(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections 
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports 
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may 
supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with depart-
ment standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or 
information from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's 
family. The victim impact statement shall: 
(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompa-
nied by a recommendation from the Department of Corrections 
regarding the payment of restitution by the defendant; 
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the 
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the 
trial court's sentencing determination. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
Department of Corrections regarding the payment of restitution by the 
defendant. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are confidential and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
Department of Corrections. 
(6) The Department of Corrections shall make the presentence investigation 
report available for review at the court ten days in advance of sentencing and 
shall mail or deliver copies to the defendant, defendant's attorney, and 
prosecutor ten days in advance of sentencing. Any inaccuracies in the presen-
tence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and 
Department of Corrections prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the 
attention of the sentencing judge, and a determination of relevance or accuracy 
shall be made by the judge on the record. If a party fails to raise an objection 
at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
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(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may 
be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(d) participate in available treatment programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(f) serve a term of home confinement; 
(g) participate in community service restitution programs, including 
the community service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance 
with Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4); and 
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appro-
priate. 
(9) (a) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the 
court, for the collection of fines, restitution, and any other costs assessed 
under Section 64-13-21 during the probation period in cases for which the 
court orders supervised probation by the department. 
(b) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the 
clerk of the court. 
(c) The clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide 
notice of the order to the parties. 
(d) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the proba-
tion period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed 
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench 
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines, 
restitution, and other amounts outstanding. 
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own 
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his 
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the 
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court and 
prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination 
of supervised probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a 
probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding 
fines, restitution, and other amounts outstanding. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
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(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for willful 
and malicious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bank-
ruptcy as provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985. 
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
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condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) that persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving 
priority for treatment over the defendants described in this subsection. 
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified private in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 1, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; or 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch. 
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1; 
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch. 
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114, 
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 134, § 2; 
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, ch. 206, § 6; 1992, ch. 
14, § 3; 1993, ch. 82, § 7; 1993, ch. 220, § 3; 
1994, ch. 13, § 24; 1994, ch. 198, § 1; 1994, 
ch. 230, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective Apnl 23, 1990, added Subsec-
tion (11). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 66, effective 
April 29, 1991, in present Subsection (2)(a) 
substituted "guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no 
contest" for "guilty or no contest" in the first 
sentence. 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 206, effective 
April 29, 1991, added present Subsection (1), 
redesignating the following subsections accord-
ingly; subdivided Subsections (2)(b), (3), (5Xa), 
(7), (8Xa), (9Xa), and (10); substituted "appro-
priations subcommittee" for "appropriations 
committee" at the end of Subsection (3Xe); 
substituted the language beginning with "pre-
sentence" and ending with "court order" for 
"report are confidential and not available ex-
cept" m Subsection (5XaXiii); inserted "evi-
dence" in the first and second sentences of 
Subsection (5)(b); added Subsections (5Xc) and 
(13); and made several punctuation and stylis-
tic changes throughout the section. 
The 1992 amendment, effective Apnl 27, 
1992, added "including the community service 
program provided m Section 78-11-20.7" to the 
end of Subsection (6Xg). 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 82, effective May 
3. 1993, added Subsection (2) and redesignated 
former Subsections (2) through (13) as Subsec-
tions (3) through (14). 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 220, effective 
May 3, 1993. added "and any other costs as-
sessed under Section 64-13-21" in present Sub-
section (8), substituted "owes" for "has" and "or 
other assessed costs" for "owing" and added 
"and other amounts outstanding" in present 
Subsection (9XaXii), substituted "and other 
amounts outstanding" for "orders" in present 
Subsection (9)(b), and made stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 13, effective May 
2, 1994 substituted "Board of Pardons and 
Parole" for "Board of Pardons" m Subsections 
(l)(c) and (4)(b); substituted "Title 77, Chapter 
2a, Pleas m Abeyance" for "Sections 77-2a-l 
through 77-2a-4" in Subsection (2); substituted 
"Subsection (4)(a)" for "Subsection (a)" m Sub-
section (4)(d); and made stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 198, effective 
May 2, 1994, added Subsection (6XaXii), re-
numbering former Subsections (6)(aXii) and 
(iii; as (iii) and dvj, and made a stylistic change. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 230, effective 
May 2, 1994, deleted former Subsection (1) 
which defined "confidential"; inserted "and Pa-
role" m Subsection (3Xb); added Subsection (6); 
designated former Subsection (6)(b) as Subsec-
tion (7); deleted former Subsection (6X0 per-
taining to the disposition of the presentence 
investigation report after the sentencing; de-
leted former Subsection (14), relating to disclo-
sure of presentence diagnostic evaluation and 
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Sec. 12, [Bights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Tony R. Maestas, 
Defendant and Aooellant. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUN 24 1997 
Julia CAIesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 960831-CA 
Before Judges Davis, Wilkins, and Jackson. 
This matter is before the court on a Motion for Remand for 
Supplementation of the Record and for Determination of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, pursuant to Rule 23B of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the case is temporarily remanded 
to the trial court for proceedings in accordance with Rule 23B of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and entry of findings of 
fact regarding appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of his 
trial counsel.
 / 
Dated this +'^T day of June, 1997, 
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1 hereby certify that on June 24, 1997, a true and correct ::.<py 
cf the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a personal 
representative cf the Legal Defender's Office to be de* p^^--> i 
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Lynn R. Brown 
Rebecca C. Hyde 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 E. 500 S., #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84.111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand 
delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney General's 
Office to be delivered to the party listed below: 
James H. 3eadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
PO Box 140854 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0354 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was depcs: ted 
in the United States ma: 1 to the tri a1 court ] i sted below: 
Honorable William A. Thorne 
Third District Court 
24C E. 400 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT"84111 
Third District Court 
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424 East 500 South, Suite 300 DEC 2 L Vfil 
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Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
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DISTRiC i A i i'CJHNiiY 
-IF THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
STATF OF UTAH, FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
T G . N . MAESTAS, Case No. 921901600FS 
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE 
Defendant 
On Octobei •,, . ^97, an Evidential Hearing was held in the above-entitled 
matter pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah R. App. \- „ ;.• -he purpose of entering hndiniih ul 
l: .HI ( iele.fv::iii1 lii Appellant1'.", rlaim ml' irifffprtivp assistance of counsel. Both parties were 
presenl Pursuant to Rule 23B(e). Utah R. App Pro and based upon the evidence 
presented by Appellant, [hit;, \ uuu eiueiij Lri«.=» II'IIIUWIIKI hni.inn.itj oi thai i 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Defendant, Tnnv Mnpstas w,is, represented at trial by 
Mr. Victor Gordon. 
2. I lie Lour I ha a reviewed iw ,nJt.. on I 
file maintained by the Utah Department of Corrections. 
3. Defense counsel gained access to said records puisudiil, In Hie 
Govern • e ml RWUJKI'I Access, and Manaq^fiiHif ""'ml I If.ih rncie Ann ^ 63-2-101 et. sec. 
(1993). 
4. The wourt has reviewed records maintained ib" 11" n • Mr ^stigalmns 
Boreai I, I'll i" I III.-iihi Dppartment of Corrections relating to the arrest and conviction of 
Tony Maestas, and the use of Tony Waldron as a confidential informant. 
5. Dei en si.1 u iun - the 
Government Records Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101 et. sec. 
(1993). 
6. ' ThiP .ifnrem.entioned records contain the following information: 
7. Tony Waldron (Waldron) was committed to the prison on November 
5, 1990, on a convictioi i - e j i - )'nip 
3 Waldron's expected release cate Ton ,.:ison was January 14, 1993. 
9. As late as February 7 Jl°°n Waldron's expected release date 
rei in II.,ilined unchanged 
On August 15, 199 1, Waldron was assigned to work at the prison 
dairy. 
i i. Oi i November *.w, 1991, W a Minn was one of thi ee inmates 
suspected of smuggling drugs at the dairy n. •. Die k. 
12. Hn rv-l HI 11, in y ' 1 1 :I;T; <A-- • - -;iS fnund to have injection sites on 
his arm, Waldi or i admitted he had been injecting steroids at the dairy. 
2 
13. Waldron was recruited h ' ' ** ' , , / n / a n investigator witl i the 
Depart. J i nnfidpnlMl iiiiilnnii.'int 
On March . ., . - 92 , Waldron was m n v w i from D-block on a 
temporary restriction order because he was "under investigation". 
15. f Caldron was released on a home visit where 
he agreed to purcha-.-- . >.e smuggled into the orison as part of an undercover 
operation - • : t is. 
16. On March 14, 1992, Tony Maestas was arrested for allegedly selling 
cocaine to Tony Waldron. 
17. * - was held by the Board 
of Pardons. A Special At tentat no is a revie\A ic ^ ra r t relief to inmates under 
special circumstances whe ie J ct ianyt ui slatiK "VJ1, U ' v lUJMletJ 
18. Waldron was paroled that G « J . , ,e was serving time for ten counts 
of Forgery, second degree felonies, one count of Fraud, a third degree feloi ly, and an 
additional I ni I > rrjpf i II 1 Ipqrpp fplnny. 
19. Waldron was never formally disciplined for possession of a controlled 
substance or drug paraphernal ia. 
20. Waldron was never charged with Possession of a Controlled 
Substance or Drug Paraphernalia,,, 
21. Waldrr „ v • - rhnnrr* i i ,-snl' . r >S Pppartment oi " 
Corrections' ir ivestig. ati ' J i that began November 28, 1991, ot his involvement ii i 
s i i 11.J g g 11 r I g d f u g s it r 11: o D fa 1 o c k. 
3 
22. Leu LLK v. " /esticja'"' " iili ihi,1 Rpparirnnnl ni Onrnpofions who 
i e< : i ni ilte :J Waldron, in a written statement, claimed that the only compensation Waldron 
r e c e j v e c j f0 his role as a confidential informant was a letter of recommendation to the 
Boaru - * * result of a dirty urine test. 
23. A review of Waldron's prisoi i files also revealed the following 
information relevant to his credibility: 
a. Waldron was convicted on September 14, 1992, of Forgery, 
a second degree felony, as well as Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner and Felony 
Fleeing. 
b. Waldron was convicted on December 12, 1990, of two counts 
of Forgery, second degree felonies. 
c. On August 7,1986, Waldron was committed to the Utah State 
Prison < me count of Possession of a Forged Writing, a third degree felony, seven 
counts ot Fjigeiv, bevjiid1 ' le j iey felonieb .nri"! Mit' '".runl "I F" "i"«",|pi ,,", ;\ IIIIM) d* :jree 
felony. 
d. Waldron had been assessed by the Department of Corrections 
in !°FP and Lid hr^n ipr,rnh rr] as jn ii,mafe who "cannot be trusted at all". 
e. In October of 1990, Waldron approached Lrr. Brian with the 
bin iini i PI itiesti;1! I i ise 
of Waldron for an undercover uiv'jstiy.itini AP&P determined that "it would not be wise 
to allow him to participate"1" because ot his history ol drug dependency and attempted 
escape. Waldror i was told "there would be no special consideration". 
4 
24 Also relevant to Waldron's credibiiity was the following information 
prison: 
a. The investigation into V V'aldion and other iniiidle'.. thai began 
in November of 1991 involved allegations that inmates were smuggling drugs by either 
hiding them in balloons in the mouth, or by "keistering" the drugs by hiding them in the 
ani„ ill oa ilh 
b. On November 10,1989, Waidron was disciplined for a positive 
i - - :r,uana and for hiding a white object ir i his mouth which he swallowed 
before guards could retrieve it. 
c. On November 20, 1989, Waidron admitted hiding two 
a "pocket" he had cut inside his coat yv. the guard was not looking. 
d. Oi i January 1, 1988, \ Waidron was disciplined for Possession 
of a Controlled Substance four id hidden in i his sock 
e. On May 29, 1988, Waidron was disciplined for possession of 
a inti'i ilh'il sulistanee. 
f. On June 7, 1988, Waldroi i was disciplined foi a positive 
urinalysis for marijuana.. 
g on March 30, 1987, Waldnin vas flisnplmed fni possession 
of a controlled substance. 
5 
25. A review of Waldron's prison file also revealed the following 
a. On v 1992, Waldron had safety concerns at the Weber 
County Jail because he had testified against other ii u i iates. 
b. On November c i , 1990, Waldron asked to be movrrl because 
of involvement in past drug dealing at the prison, 
c. V"" i a Id IUN'1, ',l f! <.' i ',:i e h1 eassessn ie 1<1 ' u i « "'" d i o•.' I ^  I i:" 1 lad 
safety concerns in February of 1990 and also in July of 1991 
26. In respect to the chain of custody in Mr. Maestas' case, it was also 
by the custodian :f the evicencff 
DATED t . ^ ^ ' • 
BY THE COURT: 
r i U D G E WfLLI, 
Third District C 
Approved as to form: 
/ 
RICHARD S. SHEPHERD^ 
Deputy District Attorney 
/ 
? 
c 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant 
M • • - i 
Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 this day of 
December, 1997. 
7 
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1 THE COURT: The Court finds there has 
2 been a violation of the terms of the conditions of 
3 probation. That violation was knowing and 
4 intentional under circumstances where the defendant 
5 had the ability to comply with the Court's order on 
6 the conditions of probation. Therefore probation 
7 will be revoked. It will not be reinstated. There 
8 are only so many chances that the Court has the 
9 disposition or the opportunity to grant them in one 
10 case and deny them in another because there are only 
11 limited resources out there. We need to provide 
12 those resources to the people who have indicated they 
13 will take advantage of that. And that is not so in 
14 this case. 
15 I do think, however, given the amount of 
16 delay that has occurred and since the feeling of the 
17 affidavit is in support of the order to show cause 
18 and this is a unique case, the defendant is entitled 
19 to credit for time served in the Salt Lake County 
20 Jail. I would ask the clerk to note specifically in 
21 the minute entry and in the order — well, you're 
22 going to have to prepare papers for me on this, Mr. 
23 Shepherd. Would you note specifically in there that 
24 the Court is aware of the view of the Department of 
25 I Corrections that credit for time served is not 
15 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
1 normally granted by them when the time served is a 
2 result of an order to show cause. And the credit for 
3 time served normally is limited only to pretrial 
4 time. And it's my recommendation that he be given 
5 credit for time served during the pendency of this 
6 matter. 
7 Is there anything else? If not, we'll be 
8 in recess. 
9 (Concluded at 4:45 p.m.) 
10 I — o O o — 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
16 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, IMC. 
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HAVE SPONTANEOUS TESTIMONY. 
TONY WALDRON. 
CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS 
EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
BY MR. SHEPHERD: 
Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME. 
A. TONY WALDRON. 
Q. WILL YOU SPELL THAT, PLEASE. 
A. W-A-L-D-R-O-N. 
Q. MR. WALDRON, ARE YOU PRESENTLY AN INMATE AT 
THE UTAH STATE PRISON? 
A. YES, I AM. 
Q. DIRECTING YOUR ATTENTION TO THE 14TH OF 
MARCH OF 1992, WERE YOU AN INMATE ON THAT DATE? 
A. YES, I WAS. 
Q. AND ON THAT DATE DID YOU ASSIST LEO LUCEY 
IN A DEPARTMENT OF OF CORRECTIONS INVESTIGATION 
RELATIVE TO ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE SOME PEOPLE WHO 
WERE PROVIDING SOURCES FOR NARCOTICS IN THE PRISON? 
A. YES. I DID. 
Q. DID YOU GO IN THE COMPANY OF AN AGENT NAMED 
TERESA GABALDON? 
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1 A. YES, I DID. 
2 Q. ON THAT DATE DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO GO TO 
3 AN APARTMENT LOCATED ON APPROXIMATELY FIFTH EAST 
4 JUST SOUTH OF 33RD SOUTH- I BELIEVE IT WAS THE 
5 APARTMENT OF JEANETTE APPLEMAN? 
6 A. YES, SIR. 
7 Q. NOW, DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO GO INTO 
8 MS. APPLEMAN'S APARTMENT WHILE TERESA GABALDON 
9 REMAINED IN THE CAR? 
10 A. YES. 
11 Q. AND WERE YOU AWARE THAT MS. GABALDON AND 
12 JEANETTE APPLEMAN WERE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE CONTACT 
13 WITH SOMEONE TO SEE IF THEY COULD ARRANGE THE 
14 PURCHASE OF COCAINE? 
15 A. YES. 
16 Q. WHILE YOU WERE IN THE APARTMENT, DID 
17 SOMEONE COME TO THE APARTMENT AND MAKE SOME CONTACT 
18 WITH HE YOU THERE? 
19 A. YES, THEY DID. 
20 Q. WAS ANYONE ELSE IN THE APARTMENT AT THE 
21 TIME? 
22 A. THERE WAS. 
23 Q. WHO WAS THAT? 
24 A. MR. CHACON AND A COUPLE OF CHILDREN. 
25 Q. DID SOMEONE ELSE COME TO THE APARTMENT? 
A. YES, THEY DID. 
Q. WHO WAS THAT? 
A. MR. MAESTAS. 
Q. MR. MAESTAS? 
A. AND ANOTHER FELLOW. 
Q. ANOTHER PERSON? 
A. YES. 
Q. WHEN THEY CAME TO THE APARTMENT, WHAT DID 
THEY DO? 
A. THEY COME AND ASKED FOR JEANETTE, AND WE 
SAID THAT SHE WAS MAKING A PHONE CALL TRYING TO GET 
SOME COCAINE. 
Q. WHAT HAPPENED THEN? 
A. HE PULLED OUT A LITTLE BAG AND SAYS, "I 
HAVE THIS RIGHT HERE." 
Q. WHO SAID THAT? 
A. MR. MAESTAS. 
Q. NOW, HE SAID WHAT? 
A. HE PULLED OUT A LITTLE BAG AND SAYS, "I 
HAVE THIS."THIS. 
Q. "I HAVE THIS"? 
A. YES. ASKED ME I WAS A COP. 
Q. AND WHAT DID YOU TELL HIM? 
A. I TOLD HIM I WASN'T. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU TELL HIM THAT YOU WERE, IF 
1 ANYTHING? 
2 A. ON A HOME VISIT. 
3 Q. THEN WHAT HAPPENED? 
4 A. WELL, WHEN HE BROUGHT OUT — HIS FRIEND 
5 LEFT. HE SHOWED ME THE COCAINE, AND I GAVE HIM ONE 
6 HUNDRED DOLLARS. HE SAYS, "WELL, I'M GOING TO GO." 
7 AND HE LEFT. 
8 I WENT IN THE BATHROOM, BECAUSE I WAS 
9 WIRED, AND TOLD LEO AND THEM TO GET THE TWO MEXICANS 
10 THAT LEFT THE APARTMENT BUILDING. 
11 Q. WHERE DID YOU OBTAIN THE MONEY? FROM LEO? 
12 A. YES, SIR. 
13 Q. HAD YOU BEEN SEARCHED PRIOR TO THIS 
14 OPERATION BEGINNING? 
15 A. YES. 
16 Q. WHO DID THAT SEARCH? 
17 A. LEO LUCEY. 
18 Q. WERE YOU SEARCHED AFTER THE OPERATION? 
19 A. YES. 
20 Q. AND WAS THAT BY ALSO LEO? 
21 A. YES. 
22 Q. NOW, AFTER YOU OBTAINED THE ALLEGED 
23 COCAINE, AND INDICATED ON THE WIRE THAT IT HAD 
24 HAPPENED, WHAT DID YOU DO THEN? 
25 A. JUST REMAINED IN THE APARTMENT. 
84 
Q. THEN WHAT HAPPENED? 
A. THEN WE — I GUESS THEY WENT AND PULLED HIM 
OVER. THEN SOME RELATION OF HIS LIVES NEXT DOOR, 
AND WE WERE GIVEN SOME MARIJUANA FROM THEM. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU DO WITH THE COCAINE? 
A. I TOOK IT DOWN TO TERESA AND GIVE TO HER. 
Q. YOU GAVE IT TO HER? 
A. YES. 
Q. THEN DID YOU GO BACK TO THE APARTMENT? 
A. YES. 
Q. I WILL SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS 
EXHIBIT TWO FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES. IF YOU'D 
JUST LIKE TO LOOK AT THAT. DOES THAT APPEAR TO BE 
THE SAME OR SIMILAR TO THE PACKAGE THAT YOU OBTAINED 
FROM MR. MAESTAS? 
A. YES. 
MR. SHEPHERD: THANK YOU. I HAVE NO 
FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
BY MR. GORDON: 
Q. WERE YOU USING DRUGS THAT DAY? 
A. NO. 
Q. HAVE YOU USED DRUGS IN THE PAST? 
A. YES, I HAVE. 
85 
Q. SO YOU KNOW WHAT THEY LOOK LIKE? 
A. YES, I DO. 
Q. HAVE YOU USED ANY DRUGS SUBSEQUENT TO THAT? 
MR. SHEPHERD: I OBJECT. I DON'T THINK 
THAT'S RELEVANT TO THIS. 
THE COURT: WHAT'S THE RELEVANCE? 
MR. GORDON: WELL, IT'S A CONTINUING 
PATTERN. HE'S A HABITUAL USER, AND I WANTED TO SHOW 
THAT. 
THE COURT: SUSTAINED. YOU DON'T NEED TO 
ANSWER THE QUESTION. 
Q. (BY MR. GORDON) ARE YOU CURRENTLY SERVING 
TIME ON A DRUG-RELATED OFFENSE. 
A. NO, I'M NOT. 
Q. OKAY. WHEN DID YOU HAVE YOUR HOME VISIT? 
WHY DID YOU TAKE YOUR HOME VISIT TIME TO INVOLVE 
YOURSELF IN — IN A RISKY KIND OF PROJECT? 
A. I WAS — MR. LEO SAID HE'D WRITE ME A GOOD 
RECOMMENDATION TO THE BOARD. 
Q. SO YOU WERE PROMISED A GOOD RECOMMENDATION 
IF YOU HELPED OUT? 
A. I WAS PROMISED A LETTER. THAT WAS IT. 
Q. NOW— 
THE COURT: MR. WALDRON, YOU NEED TO KEEP 
YOUR VOICE UP. IT'S HARD TO HEAR YOU. 
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THE WITNESS: OKAY. 
Q. (BY MR- GORDON) NOW LET ME ASK YOU— LET 
ME SEE — DESCRIBE TO ME WHAT HAPPENED ON THAT 
PARTICULAR DAY? YOU STARTED OUT AT WHAT, ABOUT 
EIGHT O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING? 
A. YES. 
Q. YOU WERE SEARCHED AT EIGHT O'CLOCK IN THE 
MORNING? 
A. YES. 
Q. OKAY. AND HOW MUCH MONEY WERE YOU GIVEN? 
A. I THINK IT WAS THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS. 
Q. AND A WIRE WAS PLACED ON YOU AT THAT TIME? 
A. YES, IT WAS. 
Q. HOW MANY TIMES WERE YOU SEARCHED THAT DAY? 
A. APPROXIMATELY FIVE. 
Q. WHAT KIND OF SEARCH WAS THAT? 
A. PAT DOWN. 
Q. PAT DOWN? 
A. I TOOK MY SHOES OFF. 
Q. SO THEY DIDN'T REALLY — NO BODY CAVITIES 
WERE SEARCHED ON ANY OF THOSE? 
A. NO. 
Q. NO. OKAY. LET ME ASK YOU THIS. YOU WERE 
SITTING UP IN AN APARTMENT AT THE VILLA FRANCHAIS, 
MAYBE AROUND NOON, EVERYBODY HAD GONE. YOU WERE 
1 WATCHING CHILDREN? 
2 A. I WAS WITH MS. CHACON. 
3 Q. SHE FINALLY LEFT, AND YOU WERE BY YOURSELF? 
4 A. NO. SHE NEVER LEFT. 
5 Q. THERE WAS NO TIME THAT YOU BY YOURSELF? 
61 A. NO, THERE WASN'T. 
7 Q. LET ME ~ SO IF I CAN REFRESH YOUR MEMORY, 
8 YOU ARE SPEAKING OVER THE WIRE AND YOU'RE SAYING, 
9 "HOW'RE YOU DOING? I AM TALKING TO A BABY, SO YOU 
10 DON'T THINK I AM HERE TALKING TO MYSELF." 
11 A. YES. MS. CHACON WAS IN THE BATHROOM. 
12 Q. SHE WAS IN THE BATHROOM, SO YOU WERE ACTUAL 
13 BY YOURSELF, HUH? 
14 A. IN THE LIVING ROOM. YES. 
15 Q. HUH? 
16 A. YES. I WAS TEN FEET AWAY FROM HER. 
17 Q. THIS SAYS, "TERESA AND THE LADY THAT LIVES 
18 HERE WENT TO GO PAGE THE GUY TO GET SOME COKE." 
19 A. YES. 
20 Q. DO YOU RECALL THAT? 
21 A. YES. 
22 Q. "THEY SHOULD BE BACK IN A MINUTE. THEY 
23 HAVE GOT ME HERE LISTENING TO NIGGER MUSIC." DO YOU 
24 REMEMBER THAT? 
25 A. YES. 
1 Q. DO YOU REMEMBER SAYING THAT? 
2 A. YES, I DO. 
3 Q. WHY WOULD YOU MAKE A STATEMENT LIKE THAT? 
4 DO YOU HAVE A PROBLEM WITH BLACK PEOPLE? MEXICANS? 
5 A. NO. I LIVE WITH THEM. 
6 Q. THAT WAS PLAIN LANGUAGE. FROM WHEN YOU ARE 
7 IN PRISON? 
8 A. YES. 
9 Q. WERE YOU EVER STRIPPED? 
10 A. WHEN I WENT TO PRISON — BACK TO PRISON 
11 THAT NIGHT, YES, I WAS. 
12 Q. BUT YOU WEREN'T STRIPPED DURING THE DAY? 
13 A. NO. 
14 Q. WHY WERE YOU RECRUITED? DID YOU VOLUNTEER? 
15 A. YES. 
16 Q. YOU VOLUNTEERED FOR THIS PROJECT. 
17 A. YES. 
18 MR. GORDON: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
19 MR. SHEPHERD: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
20 THE COURT: MAY MR. WALDRON BE EXCUSED, 
21 THEN? 
22 MR. SHEPHERD: I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT. 
23 MR. GORDON: NO. 
24 THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. WALDRON. YOU 
25 MAY STEP DOWN. YOU MAY BE EXCUSED. 
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MR. SHEPHERD: ASK LEO LUCEY TO COME IN 
PLEAS. 
LEO LUCEY. 
CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS 
EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHEPHERD: 
Q. WILL YOU STATE YOUR FULL NAME, PLEASE. 
A. LEO S. LUCEY. 
Q. WHERE ARE YOU EMPLOYED? 
A. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF UTAH. 
Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS? 
A. FIVE YEARS. 
Q. WHAT IS YOUR PRESENT ASSIGNMENT? 
A. I'M AN INVESTIGATOR FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS. 
Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN EMPLOYED AS AN 
INVESTIGATOR? 
A. A LITTLE OVER A YEAR. 
Q. WHAT SORT OF TRAINING HAVE YOU HAD, AND 
BACKGROUND THAT QUALIFIES YOU FOR THAT POSITION? 
A. I'M A CERTIFIED PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE 
